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ABSTRACT
With the passage and impending implementation of the “first-to-file”
provisions of the America Invents Act of 2011, the U.S. patent system must
rely more than ever before on patent documents for its own ontological
commitments concerning the existence of claimed kinds of useful objects
and processes. This Article provides a comprehensive description of the
previously unrecognized function of the patent document in incurring and
securing warrants to these ontological commitments, and the respective
roles of legal doctrines and practices in the patent system’s ontological
project. Among other contributions, the resulting metaphysical account
serves to reconcile competing interpretations of the written description
requirement that have emerged from the Federal Circuit’s recent
jurisprudence, and to explain why the patent system is willing and able to
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examine, grant and enforce claims reciting theoretical entities. While this
Article is entirely descriptive, it concludes by identifying promising
normative and prescriptive implications of this work, including the
formulation of an appropriate test for the patent-eligibility of softwareimplemented inventions in the post-Bilski era.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to skeptics at least, self-proclaimed psychics feign familiarity
with their clients’ personalities and problems by feeding back observed and
volunteered information as revelation, using a process known as “cold
reading.”1 It is easy to unmask the technique, if the client is willing to lie to
get at the truth. For example, a single, unemployed woman may state that
“two weeks ago I got a new job at the same company where my husband
works,” diverting the psychic into an earnest discussion of the woman’s
nonexistent marital relationship, colleagues and boss in which the psychic
simply takes her word for it that these entities exist.2
In the parlance of metaphysics, this so-called “psychic baiting” ploy
roots out cold reading3 by exposing weaknesses in the foundations of the
psychic’s ontology (what the psychic takes to exist in the world).4 The
practice of cold reading demands that the psychic take on whatever
ontological commitments (commitments to the existence of things)5 are
expressed by the client in the course of their conversation, even when those
commitments are not warranted in fact. The revelation of such a
1

See, e.g., Ray Hyman, Cold Reading: How to Convince Strangers that You Know All
About Them, 1 ZETETIC 18 (1977); Clare Wilson, Spellbound: What Gives Mediums Their
Seemingly Uncanny Ability to Read Our Minds, NEW SCIENTIST, July 30, 2005, at 32.
2
See IAN ROWLAND, THE FULL FACTS BOOK OF COLD READING 182-84 (2002)
(presenting an example of a tarot reading in which the client lies); see also id. at 115-16
(explaining that a cold-reading psychic may proceed to discuss or avoid discussion of a dog
depending on whether or not the client represents that she used to own a dog); Hyman,
supra note 1, at 22 (“The [cold] reader, after a suitable interval, will usually feed back the
information that the client has given him in such a way that the client will be further
amazed at how much the reader ‘knows’ about him. Invariably the client leaves the reader
without realizing that everything he has been told is simply what he himself has
unwittingly revealed to the reader.”).
3
See ROWLAND, supra note 2, at 182 (“In essence, psychic baiting is the only sure way
to demonstrate that someone giving readings is using cold reading, not genuine psychic
ability.”).
4
See, e.g., WILLIAM BECHTEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: AN OVERVIEW FOR COGNITIVE
SCIENCE 2 (describing scientific and philosophical approaches to ontology as views on
“what we take to exist”).
5
See, e.g., RINKE HOEKSTRA, ONTOLOGY REPRESENTATION: DESIGN PATTERNS AND
ONTOLOGIES THAT MAKE SENSE 70 n.1 (2009) (emphasis in original) (“[A]n ontological
commitment is a commitment to the existence of something…”).
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permissive and incoherent criterion of ontological commitment puts the lie
to the psychic’s claim of special knowledge regarding the true state of the
world.6
The American patent system reposes an extraordinary trust in patent
applicants that they are not similarly “baiting” the Patent Office, the courts,
and the public with untenable statements about what they have invented.
While the doctrine of inequitable conduct aims to deter applicants from
making misrepresentations in the first place,7 readers of the patent
document describing the invention generally must take the applicant’s word
for it.8 Under the longstanding doctrine of constructive reduction to
practice,9 there is no requirement that a patent applicant actually have made
or practiced what she claims to have invented; adequate disclosure in a filed
patent application suffices.10 Accordingly, the Patent Office long ago
dispensed with requiring the applicant to produce a working model of the
invention.11 With the passage and impending implementation of the “firstto-file” provisions of the America Invents Act of 2011,12 only the act of

6

See ROWLAND, supra note 2, at 8 (describing client testimonials to psychic ability);
id. at 184 (noting that the psychic-baiting client’s lie does not excuse the psychic’s claim to
have seen a nonexistent husband).
7
See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Without doubt, candor and truthful cooperation
are essential to an ex parte examination system…. The threat of inequitable conduct, with
its ‘atomic bomb’ remedy of unenforceability, ensures that candor and truthfulness.”); but
see generally Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735 (2011) (surveying recent debate over whether
inequitable conduct doctrine actually reduces fraud and suggesting reforms).
8
The applicant is the author of the patent document because the patent application,
authored by the applicant, “ripens into” the patent document upon issuance. See, e.g.,
Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader,
J., concurring).
9
See Warren H. Willner, Origin and Development of the Doctrine of Constructive
Reduction to Practice, 36 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 618, 619-20, 622-23 (1954) (tracing the
doctrine to Wheeler v. Clipper Mower, 29 F. Cas. 881 (C.C.N.Y. 1872) and Dolbear v.
American Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888)).
10
See Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (constructive
requirement to practice requires adequate disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 278 (“A constructive reduction to practice is the filing of a patent application
with the [PTO] ... that adequately discloses the invention.”).
11
See Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790-1880 (Part IIConclusion), 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 235, 271 (1983) (“In 1880 the general model
requirement was finally dropped from the rules of the Patent Office.”); but see infra text
accompanying notes 189-191 (describing rare situations where examiners may require a
working model).
12
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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filing a patent application, not that of making or practicing the invention,
will count toward establishing the priority of an inventor’s patent claims.13
Now more than ever, the patent system must rely on applicants’
representations in patent documents for its own ontological commitments
concerning the existence of categories of “useful Arts”;14 i.e., kinds of
objects and processes capable of producing beneficial effects in the world.15
Fortunately, the patent system need not practice cold reading in its
dealings with patent applicants, and its criteria of ontological commitment
in reading patent documents are much less permissive and more coherent
than those of a psychic. As this Article will explain, this is because the
adequate disclosure requirements of § 112 of the Patent Act serve to
regulate the patent document’s role in informing the patent system’s
ontological commitments.
Specifically, the written description and
enablement requirements enforce the conditions under which the patent
system incurs ontological commitments to patent claims and takes such
commitments to be warranted, respectively. More fundamentally, this
Article will serve to identify and describe the previously unrecognized, but
increasingly salient, ontological function of the patent document.
This Article departs methodologically from previous legal scholarship
in its focused search for, and reliance on, the patent system’s metaphysical
commitments.
Scholars who have previously attributed particular
metaphysical stances to the patent system have generally done so in order to
reject those stances, thereby clearing the way for proposed policy or
doctrinal reforms.16 A common characteristic of this literature is that
modern philosophy supplies much of the artillery against the accused
stances, but few fortifications in support of the proposed changes; thus

Section 3 of the Act, which contains the “first-to-file” provisions, goes into effect eighteen
months from the date of enactment, on March 16, 2013. See id. at 285.
13
See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82 (2009) (explaining that in a first-to-file system, “[t]he inventor needs
to file early because the filing date, not the date of invention, determines priority amongst
competing inventors”).
14
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
… useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to … Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective … Discoveries”).
15
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 268 (1853)) (“It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means
of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted. . . .”).
16
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 186 (2007) (arguing that the conception-focused
inventorship doctrine exemplifies a “striking pattern of dualism” in the patent system that
is subject to critique); Simon, supra note 18, at 2192-97 (arguing that modern metaphysics
has undermined patent law’s characterization of laws of nature as fundamental truths).
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potentially powerful metaphysical insights ultimately serve only as adjuncts
to normative appeals for reform. In contrast, this Article aims to
demonstrate that an explicit recognition of, and reliance on, the patent
system’s core metaphysical commitments would be not only
jurisprudentially defensible, but also instrumental in illuminating the form
and nature of the project of “promot[ing] the Progress of … useful Arts”17
and in aligning patent laws and institutions with that constitutional purpose.
The advantage of such an approach is that any resulting doctrinal proposals
can find warrant not only on policy grounds, but also, importantly, as
metaphysically necessary consequences of settled legal principles.
Even though the Supreme Court long ago recognized patent law as the
“most metaphysical branch of modern law,”18 the bench, bar and academy
to date have shown remarkably little interest in articulating, stabilizing and
building on the essential metaphysical foundations of the patent system.19
Courts in patent cases have tended instead to attach the term “metaphysical”
pejoratively to considerations deemed too theoretical to guide practical
jurisprudence.20 Practitioners, scholars and other commentators have

17

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. 437, 485-86 (1848); see also Rohm & Haas Co. v.
Dawson Chemical Co., 599 F.2d 685, 706 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Judge Rich’s comment
that “patent law is ‘the metaphysics’ of the law”); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344
(C.C. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.) (“Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other
class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of
the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very [subtle] and refined, and,
sometimes, almost evanescent.”); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices
and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 14 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 87, 92 (2004) (describing patent law as
a “metaphysical branch of the law” and “the invisible, intangible, incorporeal patent right”
as “one of the most elusive of all legal concepts”); cf. Ariel Simon, Reinventing Discovery:
Patent Law's Characterizations of and Interventions Upon Science, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2175, 2197 (2009) (noting that “the metaphysics of patent law” is “foundational to
doctrines of patentable subject matter” but suggesting that “abstract questions of reality
otherwise play little to no role in patent law”).
19
Cf. Darren Hudson Hick, Making Sense of the Copyrightability of Plots: A Case
Study in the Ontology of Art, 67 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 399, 399 (2009)
(observing that “while copyright law assumes some metaphysical basis to its objects, this
basis tends to go largely uninvestigated.”) (emphasis in original).
20
See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Linn, J.,
concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“[T]he outer limits of statutory subject matter
should not depend on metaphysical distinctions such as those between hardware and
software or matter and energy, but rather with the requirements of the patent statute. . .”);
Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983) (contrasting the
courts’ earlier “metaphysical and semantic” approach to double patenting with the
“specific, workable criteria” used in the current test); Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co. v.
Wilson Jones Loose Leaf Co., 286 F. 715, 720 (S.D.N.Y.1920) (Hand, J.) (dismissing “the
metaphysical question whether [a binder and rack] form a ‘combination’ or an
18
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generally followed suit, criticizing metaphysical approaches to patent
doctrine as exceeding the competence of the Patent Office and the
judiciary,21 clashing with scientific methods and teachings,22 and ignoring
‘aggregation’”); Wilson v. Singer, 30 F. Cas. 217, 220 (C.C.D.C. 1860) (rejecting
alternative interpretation of joint inventorship law as “too refined and metaphysical for the
practical business of life”); see also Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254 (C.C. Mass. 1825)
(Story, J.) (“It did not appear to me at the trial, and does not appear to me now, that this
mode of reasoning upon the metaphysical nature, or the abstract definition of an invention,
can justly be applied to cases under the patent act. That act proceeds upon the language of
common sense and common life, and has nothing mysterious or equivocal in it.”); Neil A.
Smith, Remembrances and Memorial: Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, 1904-1999, 9 FED.
CIR. B.J. 87, 92 (1999) (noting that one of Judge Rich’s stated intentions in drafting § 103
of the Patent Act was “to release the courts from all the metaphysical law of the cases
about this concept of ‘invention’ and to make it clear that not all inventions, only
unobvious inventions, are patentable.”); cf. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 134-35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that majority’s exclusion of
“manifestations of laws of nature” from patentable subject matter relies on “vague and
malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation”); Rohm & Haas Co.,
599 F.2d at 706 (noting “the difficulty of the subject matter” of 35 U.S.C. § 271, which
Judge Rich referred to as “the metaphysics of patent law”); Jamesbury Corp. v. U.S., 518
F.2d 1384, 1396 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (quoting Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., 352 F. Supp.
1357, 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1972)) (describing joint inventorship as “one of the muddiest
concepts in the muddy metaphysics of patent law”).
21
See, e.g., William Michael Schuster, Predictability and Patentable Processes: The
Federal Circuit's In Re Bilski Decision and Its Effect on the Incentive to Invent, 11 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2009) (“[I]nherently difficult metaphysical questions such as
‘What is an abstract idea?’ or ‘What is the claimed invention?’ are not the expertise of
judges or patent examiners but rather philosophers.”); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the
Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 804 (2003) (noting that State Street Bank’s
relatively simple test for patent-eligibility held the promise of “decreas[ing] Patent Office
workload by allowing examiners to avoid the metaphysical inquires that sometimes
accompanied” previous tests, though increased filings have swamped any such effect);
Todd R. Geremia, Protecting the Right to Copy: Trade Dress Claims for Configurations in
Expired Utility Patents, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 779, 814 (1998) (“[T]o ask courts to make the
metaphysical determination of exactly what constitutes the ‘true,’ ‘essential,’ or
‘significant’ inventive components of a formerly patented invention is to invite chaos and
unpredictability.”); Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles Of Patent and Copyright in the
Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 43 (1998)
(criticizing “some 20 years of § 101 subject matter metaphysics” during which judges and
the Patent Office “had great difficulty extricating themselves from the form in which
[software] technology appeared”); John A. Kidwell, Software and Semiconductors: Why
Are We Confused?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 533, 566 (1985) (“The norms of patent law generally
create problems in their administration because patent law is notorious for asking judges to
apply criteria that are almost metaphysical in character.”); cf. Douglas A. Applegate,
Patenting Improvements: The Costs of Making Patents Easily Available, 8 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 429, 442 (1992) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s
approach to combination patents in the wake of Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966) unhelpfully “wreaked confusion in the patent bar, and rekindled judicial inquiries
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normative economic considerations.23
These concerns should of course be taken seriously. It would indeed be
foolish to expect the Patent Office or the courts to resolve long-contested
metaphysical questions in the course of administering, enforcing, applying,
and developing the patent laws. It would be equally unwise for patent law
and policy to abandon sound science and economics for the sake of mere
metaphysical line-drawing.
At the same time, the patent system’s metaphysical commitments also
need to be taken seriously. As Steven Smith persuasively argues in Law’s
Quandary,24 metaphysical commitments “pervade and inform the ways that
lawyers talk and argue and predict and that judges decide and justify.”25
Legal scholars have long recognized the involvement of the metaphysics of
causation in accounts of legal responsibility, particularly in the areas of
into the metaphysics of patentable invention”); but see Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and
the Common Law of Patents, 90 BOSTON U. L. REV. 51, 57-58 (2010) (citing Jamesbury)
(“[M]ore than two centuries of experience has taught us that the common law has handled
its responsibility relatively well when engaging ‘the muddy metaphysics of the patent
law.’”); but cf. John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent
Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 266-67 (1998)
(arguing that “jurists, PTO officials, and commentators concerned with the patent system
have not been particularly articulate in describing [the] ontological task” of identifying the
invention that is the subject of an artfully drafted patent claim, but proposing that the courts
and the PTO employ “the philosophical discipline of phenomenology”).
22
See, e.g., Simon, supra note 18, at 2192 (“[P]atentable-subject-matter jurisprudence
is filled with metaphysical curiosities that bear little resemblance to how historians of
science, philosophers, or even scientists think about science.”); Andrew W. Torrance,
Metaphysics and Patenting Life, 76 UMKC L. REV. 363, 395 (2007) (criticizing the
Canadian Supreme Court’s appeal to “metaphysical phenomena, such as souls and spirits,”
in delineating the patentability of life forms, as being “outside the analytical reach of the
scientific method”); cf. DAVID R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE: LAW,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 102-04, 111 & 121-24 (2000)
(arguing that the current “legal ontology” of information technology draws distinctions
among media of expression that computer science shows to be false, and advocating legal
reform based on “correct ontologies,” including the abolition of software patents).
23
See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into AfterArising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 493, 554-58 (2008) (arguing that metaphysical approaches to after-arising
technologies will lead courts “to dole out identical treatment for pairings of patentees and
alleged infringers who are distinct from a normative perspective”); A. Samuel Oddi,
Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L.
REV. 73, 127-30 (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s metaphysical approach in
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980), led to a result that
creates uneven incentives for inventive activity).
24
Steven Douglas Smith, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004).
25
See Steven D. Smith, Metaphysical Perplexity?, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 639, 644-45
(2006) (summarizing a central thesis of LAW’S QUANDARY for a symposium on the book).
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criminal and tort law.26 In the patent system, inventors, examiners, lawyers
and judges are tasked with drafting and reviewing statements about the
capacities of objects and processes to cause beneficial effects in the world.27
Patent claims (the patent system’s stock in trade28) are essentially ad hoc
ontological categories29 (the metaphysician’s stock in trade30). It is not hard

26

See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION & RESPONSIBILITY (2009); H.L.A. HART
& TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); Marcelo Ferrante, Causation in
Criminal Responsibility, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 470 (2008); Michael Moore, For What
Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181
(2003); Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L. REV. 827
(2000); Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 879 (2000); Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean By “Causation” in the Law, 73
MO. L. REV. 433 (2008); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735
(1985).
27
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 268 (1853)) (“It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means
of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted. . . .”).
28
See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims:
American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L., 497, 499 (1990)
(“To coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claim.”).
29
See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008) (noting “the ontological nature of
patent claims”).
30
See Jan Westerhoff, The Construction of Ontological Categories, 82 AUSTRALASIAN
J. PHILOSOPHY 595, 595 (2004) (“[T]he notion of an ontological category . . . is central to
ontology and metaphysics (it is, after all, what these disciplines are about)”).
It should be noted that Westerhoff’s highly abstract notion of an ontological category
excludes “categories as specific as kni[v]es and forks, tables and chairs, or chairs and
palaces,” see id. at 596, and presumably would also exclude typical patent claims. Neither
do patent claims appear to provide a general ontological account of the relation between
artifacts as “higher-order objects and their material basis.” See Wybo Houkes & Anthonie
Meijers, The Ontology of Artefacts: The Hard Problem, 37 STUD. HIST. PHIL. SCI. 118, 119
(2006) (concluding that describing such a relation is “a hard problem in metaphysics”).
Patent claim drafting’s ad hoc approach is more closely related to the recent use of
ontological categories in information science and biomedicine to organize domain-specific
knowledge. See Katherine Munn, What is Ontology For?, in APPLIED ONTOLOGY: AN
INTRODUCTION 7, 10-12 (Katherine Munn & Barry Smith eds., 2009) (discussing the need
for an information system to “have a categorial structure readymade for slotting each piece
of information programmed into it under the appropriate heading” and to organize domainspecific human knowledge about reality); The Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies
<http://www.obofoundry.org/> (visited January 3, 2011) (providing open-source ontologies
for further research and development in various fields of biology and biomedical research).
While longstanding patent doctrine entitles inventor-applicants to devise their own
ontologies within the scope of the prosecution history, see, e.g., Process Control Corp. v.
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to imagine that ontological commitments might attach to legal accounts of
patent acquisition, validity, and infringement, even if only tacitly, giving
rise to a rich ontology of “useful Arts.” Part II of this Article develops the
first descriptive account of such an ontology, deriving formal
characterizations of the ontological status of claims and their embodiments
from linguistics and the philosophy of science.
Given the long-settled principle of patent claim interpretation that
claims are to be read in light of the specification,31 it is not surprising that
the specification informs the patent system’s ontology. Parts III and IV
address the role of the specification in incurring and warranting ontological
commitments to claims and their embodiments. Part III offers an
interpretation of the written description requirement as a doctrine of
ontological possession. This interpretation reconciles the Federal Circuit’s
affirmation, in its recent Ariad en banc opinion,32 that adequate written
description requires that the applicant demonstrate “possession of the
invention”33 with Jeffrey Lefstin’s equally defensible reading of the
requirement as a demand for adequate “definitional information”
concerning the scope of patent claims.34 Part IV exhibits the enablement
requirement’s role in ensuring that the patent system’s ontological
commitments are warranted. To my knowledge, the legal literature has not
previously explained the fact that the patent system routinely is willing and
able to examine, grant, and enforce claims reciting unobserved theoretical
entities, effectively taking the word of scientists that subatomic particles
and the like exist.35 Using the Federal Circuit’s decision in Centricut v.

HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have held many times that a
patentee can act as his own lexicographer to specifically define terms of a claim contrary to
their ordinary meaning”), at least one information science researcher questions the
necessity of this ad hoc approach. Jeffrey Gower, a graduate student at University at
Buffalo-SUNY, has embarked on a massive computer-driven effort to unify the ontology of
patent claims around “a structured and controlled vocabulary.” See 3TU Center for Ethics
and
Technology,
Towards
an
Ontology
of
Patent
Claims
<http://www.ethicsandtechnology.eu/news/comments/towards_an_ontology_of_patent_clai
ms/> (visited July 8, 2010) (abstract for Gower’s Apr. 29, 2010 presentation).
31
See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(quoting In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 300 (C.C.P.A. 1982)); Nash Engineering Co. v. Cashin,
13 F.2d 718, 721 (1st Cir. 1926).
32
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
33
See id. at 1351.
34
See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1217 (2008).
35
The search query “clm(electron) & da(2011)” to Westlaw’s US-PAT database finds
2,726 patents issued in 2011 containing the word “electron” in at least one claim.

10 THE ONTOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE PATENT DOCUMENT
Esab Group36 as a case study, I explain how the patent system’s
epistemological commitment to scientific realism informs the court’s
analysis of claims involving the causal powers of electrons.
If this account of the ontological function of the patent document is
reasonably accurate, it can illuminate not only the form and nature of the
patent system’s project of “promoting … Progress,” but the coherence of
proposed reforms with that project.37 Thus, even though this Article is
entirely descriptive, it has extensive normative and prescriptive implications
that warrant further investigation. Part V concludes by summarizing this
Article’s descriptive analysis and previewing its prescriptive sequel.
Responding to the Federal Circuit’s split decision in In re Nuijten,38 I
explain how an “essential causation requirement” reflecting the patent
system’s metaphysical commitments might put patentable subject matter
doctrine on a firmer footing, while deferring a fuller discussion of
recommended reforms to a future article.39
II. THE PATENT SYSTEM’S ONTOLOGY OF “USEFUL ARTS”
A. The Ontological Status of Claims
1. Claims as Kinds
In the modern patent system, patent claims “stand alone to define the
invention.”40 Any study of the patent system’s ontological commitments
must therefore begin with a precise metaphysical and linguistic
characterization of the (valid41) patent claims that are the subject of those
commitments.
A widespread misconception about patent claims is that they are nothing
more than sets of embodiments, so that certain doctrines about claim scope
can be reduced to set-theoretic propositions.42 This is a useful intuition for

36

Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 814 (2005).
37
See supra text accompanying note 17.
38
500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
39
See Andrew Chin, “Machine or Transformation”: The Right Test for a “Time of
Terabytes” (working title, forthcoming 2013).
40
Ex Parte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1609 (B.P.A.I. 1993).
41
It is implicit throughout this section III.A that any discussion of the linguistic
structure of claims is referring to valid claims. It is, of course, possible to file a
linguistically nonsensical or deviant claim, but such a claim would not be held valid. See
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.”).
42
See, e.g., Thomas D. Brainard, Patent Claim Construction: A Graphic Look, 82 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 670 (2000) (depicting “[t]he patent concepts of validity,
infringement, prior art, the doctrine of equivalents, file history estoppel and principles of
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introducing the notion of claim scope and the distinction between claims
and embodiments.
It is an imprecise and inadequate ontological
description, however, because while the definition of a set necessarily
determines its elements,43 the language of a claim does not determine
which, if any, of its embodiments exist. Conversely, the number of existing
embodiments of a patent claim has no effect on the claim’s scope.44 All
empty sets are identical,45 but there are many distinct patent claims with no
existing embodiments.46
For purposes of metaphysical and linguistic ontology, it is more
accurate to describe patent claims and their embodiments in terms of the
distinction between types and tokens. In metaphysics, the type-token
distinction conceptually separates a category (an abstract type) from its
members (a concrete token, which exemplifies the type).47 In linguistics,
the term kind is often used synonymously with type:48 thus, a noun phrase

claim differentiation” with Venn diagrams); Raj S. Dave, A Mathematical Approach to
Claim Elements and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 507, 518-25
(2003) (using Venn diagrams to illustrate doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history
estoppel); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 772
(2009) (stating the “consensus” view that patent claims should “enable a properly sized set
of embodiments — not too big, not too small — to be protected”); Charles L. Gholz, A
Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
464, 476-83 (2004) (using Venn diagram to illustrate blocking situation resulting from
interference decision); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and
Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947,
1984 (2005) (describing the “refinement” of patent claims during prosecution as the
“process of identifying and claiming the broadest patentable set of embodiments enabled
by the disclosure in the patent specification”); Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine
Obviousness: Applying the Pioneer Doctrine to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375,
418-24 (2001) (describing anticipation and obviousness in terms of Venn diagrams); but cf.
Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1159-67 (finding that “[n]early all of the doctrines of patent law
… may be posed almost as mathematical set-functions whose truth value is described in
terms of the claimed subject matter,” but concluding that “patent law [is] not reducible to a
simple set-theoretic system” insofar as it is impossible “to formulate a doctrine of
enablement as a simple function of exclusion or inclusion”).
43
See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Toward an Ontology of Art Works, 9 NOUS 115, 121
(1975) (noting that “whatever members a set has it has necessarily”).
44
See Collins, supra note 23, at 503 (noting that the exclusionary scope of a widget
patent claim “is unaffected by a patentee's decision to manufacture ten or ten thousand
widgets”).
45
See Wolterstorff, supra note 43 (“That there is but one null set is clear enough.”).
46
To be valid, a patent claim need not be actually reduced to practice.
47
See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 936-37 (Robert Audi ed. 1999)
(defining “type-token distinction”).
48
See, e.g., WAYNE A. DAVIS, MEANING, EXPRESSION, AND THOUGHT 316 (“I can see
no metaphysical reason not to use ‘type’ and ‘kind’ interchangeably, and thus to describe
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may refer to a kind rather than a particular object, as in “The Irish economy
became dependent upon the potato.”49 In both of these contexts, a patent
claim is accurately understood as a type or kind whose embodiments are its
tokens or examples.50
The metaphysics literature provides strong support for the view that
patent claims are kinds of embodiments. In an influential51 1975 article,
philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff sets out to determine the ontological
status of various creative works.52 He takes pains to distinguish between
works and their examples, in much the same way that the 1976 Copyright
Act dissects the bundle of uses of an underlying copyrighted work.53
(Despite the clear relevance of this work for copyright law, he does not
mention copyright, and his analysis does not appear to have engaged the
attention of legal scholars.54) Wolterstorff squarely rejects “the view that
performance-works and object-works are sets of their examples,”55
reasoning that the existence of a creative work is independent of the
existence of performances and artifacts exemplifying the work:
Just as an art work might have had different and more or
fewer performances and objects than it does have, so too the
kind Man, for example, might have had different and more
or fewer examples than it does have. If Napoleon had not
existed, it would not then have been the case that Man did
not exist. Rather, Man would then have lacked one of the
examples which in fact it had. And secondly, just as there

words and thoughts as kinds of things.”).
49
See Manfred Krifka et al., Genericity: An Introduction, in THE GENERIC BOOK 1, 2
(Gregory N. Carlson & Francis Jeffry Pelletier ed. 1995) (emphasis in original) (noting that
“the potato” in this sentence does not refer to “some particular potato or group of potatoes,
but rather the kind Potato (Solanum tuberosum) itself”).
50
See Collins, supra note 23, at 503 (“Except in the calculation of damages, references
to ‘things’ or ‘sets of things’ in patent law invoke types, not tokens.”); cf. Sean B.
Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010) (“An
‘embodiment’ is a concrete form of an invention (like a chemical compound or a widget)
described in a patent application or patent.”).
51
See Charles Nussbaum, Kinds, Types, and Musical Ontology, 61 J. AESTHETICS &
ART CRITICISM 273, 273 (2003) (describing Wolterstorff’s article as “influential”).
52
See Wolterstorff, supra note 43, at 115 (“What sort of entity is a symphony? A
drama? A dance? A graphic art print? A sculpture? A poem? A film? A painting? Are
works of art all fundamentally alike in their ontological status?”).
53
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
54
No citation to Wolterstoff’s article appears in Westlaw’s TP-ALL database.
Subsequent philosophers, however, have recently begun to examine the ontological status
of objects of copyright law. See, e.g., Hick, supra note 19.
55
Wolterstorff, supra note 43, at 121.
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may be two distinct unperformed symphonies, so too may
there be two distinct unexampled kinds — e.g., the Unicorn
and the Hippogriff.56
Wolterstorff writes that these observations “tend[] at once to confirm us in
the suggestion that art works are kinds whose examples are the examples of
those works.”57 More specifically, “[a] performance-work is a certain kind
of performance; an object-work is a certain kind of object.58
Wolterstorff’s analysis of creative works applies with equal force to
patent claims. Like a symphony composition that exists (and is the subject
of copyright) regardless of how often it has been performed, a patent claim
exists and defines the same scope of patent rights regardless of which, if
any, embodiments of the claim exist. Patent claims can also exist as
unexampled kinds, because an inventor may obtain a patent without actually
reducing the invention to practice. Under the doctrine of constructive
reduction to practice, the filing of a patent application satisfying the written
description, enablement and best mode requirements of § 11259 has the
same legal effect as conception and actual reduction to practice through the
creation of an operative embodiment.60 These observations support the
conclusion that a patent claim is a kind whose examples are its
embodiments.
Recent linguistics scholarship also leads to the conclusion that patent
claims are kinds of embodiments. Interestingly, linguists have singled out
the verb “invent” as a stock example of a kind-level predicate; i.e., an
expression that can be true of a kind but not of individual members or of
quantified sets of members of the kind.61 As a group of leading scholars in

56

Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 126.
58
Id.
59
35 U.S.C. § 112.
60
Compare Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The filing off a
patent application serves as conception and constructive reduction to practice of the subject
matter described in the application.”); Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 885
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (“[T]he act of filing the United States application has the legal effect of
being, constructively at least, a simultaneous conception and reduction to practice of the
invention.”) with Slip Track Systems, Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1265 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (“In order to establish actual reduction to practice, the inventor must prove that
he constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the
claim, and that he determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose.”).
61
See GREGORY N. CARLSON, REFERENCES TO KINDS IN ENGLISH 47-48 (1980)
(identifying a class of predicates “which cannot meaningfully be said of any particular
individuals, nor can they meaningfully be said of any of the quantified NP’s of the
language” and referring to them as “special predicates”); see also Predicate (grammar),
WIKIPEDIA <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Predicate_(grammar)#Kind-level_predicates>
57

14 THE ONTOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE PATENT DOCUMENT
the field explains:
There are some predicates with argument places that can be
filled only with kind-referring NPs [noun phrases].
Examples are the subject argument of die out or be extinct
and the object argument of invent or exterminate. The
reason is, of course, that only kinds (not objects) can die out
or be invented.62
Linguists therefore justifiably regard a kind-level predicate as strongly
indicative of an accompanying reference to a kind.63
As with Wolterstorff’s dissection of creative works, this linguistic
analysis neither references nor is referenced by the legal literature.64 Yet
the ongoing examination of “invent” as a linguistic predicate offers a
significant insight into the grammar of patent claims.
Indefinite singular noun phrases (e.g., singular nouns preceded by the
indefinite article “a” or “an”) have been regarded as incompatible with
kind-level predicates.65 For example, it is valid to say “Bell invented the
telephone” or “Honeybees are dying out” but unacceptable to say “A lion
will become extinct soon.”66 Bart Geurts and Veneeta Dayal have pointed
out, however, that an indefinite singular noun phrase is acceptable
“provided it names a novel kind.”67 For example, the sentence “This

(visited February 15, 2011) (defining a kind-level predicate as a predicate that “is true of a
kind of thing, but cannot be applied to individual members of the kind”). The
characterization of kind-level predicates is credited to Carlson. See, e.g., THEODORE B.
FERNALD, PREDICATES AND TEMPORAL ARGUMENTS 37 (2000) (describing kind-level
predicates as a “type theoretic distinction” drawn by Carlson).
62
See Krifka, supra note 49, at 10 (Gregory N. Carlson & Francis Jeffry Pelletier eds.
1995); see also Berit Brogaard, Sharvy’s Theory of Definite Descriptions Revisited, 88
PAC. PHIL. Q. 160, 160, 177 n.12 (2007) (“‘Babbage invented the computer,’ for example,
does not seem to be making a claim about the sum of the world’s computers. Rather, it
seems to be making a claim about the concept computer.”); Friederike Moltmann,
Properties and Kinds of Tropes: New Linguistic Facts and Old Philosophical Insights, 113
MIND 1, 33 n.23 (2004) (citing “were invented” as an example of a “kind-specific
predicate”); Roberto Zamparelli, Definite and Bare Kind-Denoting Noun Phrases, in
ROMANTIC LANGUAGES AND LINGUISTIC THEORY 2000, at 305, 311-12 (Claire Beyssade et
al. eds. 2002) (providing “invented” as an example of a kind-level predicate operating on
“Edison” and “light-bulbs”).
63
See Zamparelli, supra note 62, at 309 (“Probably the best case for the linguistic
relevance of kinds comes from predicates which cannot usually apply to ordinary
individuals….”).
64
The terms “kind-level predicate,” “kind-specific predicate” and “kind predicate” do
not appear in Westlaw’s TP-ALL database.
65
See Krifka, supra note 49, at 10.
66
See id.
67
See Veneeta Dayal, Number Marking and (In)Definiteness in Kind Terms, 27
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morning Fred invented a pumpkin-crusher” is a valid sentence in which the
noun phrase “a pumpkin-crusher” denotes a novel kind.68 As Olav MuellerReichau explains,
Dayal’s point of departure was the widespread assumption
that the use of an indefinite article is connected to a certain
pragmatic novelty condition. This condition brings it about
that any individual designated by an indefinite noun phrase
must be understood as being newly introduced into the
discourse. What is (more or less) common wisdom as far as
interpretations at the object-level are concerned, is supposed
to be true also at the kind-level: indefinite NPs are used to
introduce kinds when they have the status of novel discourse
referents.69
Read as a whole, the grammar of a patent claim is consistent with that of
one or more novel kinds serving as object arguments for the predicate
“invented.” While boilerplate such as “I claim,” “We claim,” “The
invention claimed is,” or “What is claimed is,” is more common,70 implicit
in the language preceding every set of patent claims is the assertion that the
applicant invented the subject matter of the claims.71 Thus, for example, in
the following claim:
8. A golf ball having a cover and a core wherein the cover
comprises a thermoset cationic polyurethane ionomer.72
“a golf ball,” “a cover,” “a core,” and “a thermoset cationic polyurethane
ionomer” are all indefinite singular noun phrases. The sentence that begins
with “We invented” and concludes with the text of claim 8 is a valid
sentence in which “invented” is a kind-level predicate and each indefinite
noun phrase introduces a novel kind into the discourse of the claim.
More generally, the prohibition on “inferential claiming,”73 a technical
rule of claim drafting, strictly regulates the use of definite and indefinite

LINGUISTICS & PHILOSOPHY 393, 396 (2004) (citing Bart Geurts, Genericity, Anaphora and
Scope, Paper presented at the Workshop on Genericity, University of Cologne (2001)).
68
See id.
69
See OLAV MUELLER-REICHAU, SORTING THE WORLD: ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE
TYPE/TOKEN-DISTINCTION
TO
REFERENTIAL
SEMANTICS
66
(2011)
<http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/zg0ODVjY/typetoken.pdf> (visited Feb. 15, 2011)
(citation omitted).
70
See FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 2:2, at 2-2 (2009) (citing
M.P.E.P. § 608.01(m)).
71
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (providing that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless
… he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented”).
72
U.S. Patent No. 5,692,974, cl. 8 (issued Dec. 2, 1997).
73
See Faber, supra note 70, at § 10:7.4, at 10-43.
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articles preceding claim elements. Patent attorneys are instructed:
It is important that a new item mentioned for the first
time in the claim not be first mentioned as an element
operated upon or cooperated with by a previous element
described in the same clause….
A new element or step is introduced with an indefinite
article “a” or “an.” (Some plural items have no introductory
article “a” and are introduced by the plural noun itself. But,
from the context, the silent introductory indefinite article can
be inferred.) On the other hand, when a previously identified
element or step is repeated, it is introduced by a definite
article “the” or “said.”74
In linguistic terms, each indefinite noun phrase in the body of the claim
introduces a novel kind — i.e., a new element or step — into the discourse
of the claims. As for the preamble of the claim, each indefinite noun phrase
appearing therein introduces the claim as a whole, which itself refers to a
novel kind, provided that the claim is valid.75 In the product claim example
above, each of the indefinite singular noun phrases represents a novel kind.
In process claims, steps typically take the form of gerunds,76 which have the
external characteristics of a noun phrase77 and therefore also represent novel
kinds when they lack antecedent basis. Claim drafting thus conforms to the
linguistic practice of using indefinite noun phrases “to introduce kinds when
they have the status of novel discourse referents”;78 i.e., when there is no
antecedent basis in the claims that serves as a referent for the newly
mentioned element or step. Simply put, claims are written as novel kinds
are written.
As we have seen, recent scholarship in metaphysical and linguistic
ontology provides strong analytical support for the characterization of
patent claims as kinds, rather than sets, of embodiments. This may have
been a distinction without a difference in the previous patent literature,79 but
the significance of patent claims’ kindhood is immediately evident when we
undertake to examine the nature of the patent system’s ontological

74

Id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (f) & (g) (requiring the applicant to be the first inventor
of the claimed invention).
76
See, e.g., Lock See Yu-Jahnes, An Introduction to Claim Drafting, 906 PLI/Pat 143,
151 (2007).
77
See Richard Hudson, Gerunds Without Phrase Structure, 21 NATURAL LANGUAGE
& LINGUISTIC THEORY 579, 579 (2003).
78
MULLER-REICHAU, supra note 69.
79
The search term “kind of embodiment” does not appear in Westlaw’s TP-ALL
database.
75
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commitments.80
2. Claim Language and Essential Sortals
Claims are kinds, but they are not natural kinds: their boundaries are
fixed a posteriori by patent attorneys, not a priori by nature.81 At least
according to Aristotelian metaphysics, only natural kinds can be said to
have essential properties;82 i.e., properties that it is metaphysically
necessary for a thing of the kind to have.83 Evidently, however, the patent
system’s worldview is not Aristotle’s worldview because, as I will now
explain, claims are a kind of kind that has essential properties.84
Specifically, the language of a claim facilitates picking out individuals of
the claimed kind and identifying properties of those individuals that are
essential to their kind.85
80

See infra Section III.C.
See BRIAN ELLIS, SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 19 (2001) (“[M]embership of a natural
kind is decided by nature, not by us…. [T]he identity of a natural kind can never be
dependent only on our interests, perceptual apparatus, languages, practices, or choices. For
if the identity of a kind depended on any of these these things, then it might well be a kind
of our own making, not one that exists in the world prior to our knowledge, perception, or
description of it.”).
82
See Collins, supra note 23, at 525-26 (citing Michael R. Ayers, Locke Versus
Aristotle on Natural Kinds, 78 J. PHIL. 247, 252 (1981)).
83
See Teresa Robertson, Essential vs. Accidental Properties, in STANFORD
ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at § 1, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental/
(characterizing essential properties modally in terms of metaphysical necessity and
possibility).
84
Cf. Collins, supra note 23, at 526-27 (suggesting that courts are influenced by “a
different and more modern type of essentialism” that is “scientific, physical and
structural”).
85
This essentialist approach to kinds is most commonly associated with the causal
account of reference developed by linguistic philosophers Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam.
See SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of
Meaning, in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 215 (1975). An
anti-essentialist, descriptivist theory of reference also has a distinguished pedigree. See,
e.g., Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479 (1905).
In a fascinating forthcoming article, Daniel Nazer finds both theories implicitly at play
in patent doctrine. See Daniel Nazer, Solving Rader’s Paradox: Patent Law’s Quest for a
Theory of Reference, draft. While Nazer finds that descriptivism tends to be dominant, he
declines to find either theory to be the sole “correct” one, and argues for the necessity of
keeping the essentialist approach available to inform patent doctrine (e.g., in applying the
written description requirement to biotechnology patent claims when reference-fixing
descriptions are impracticable.) See id.
Nazer’s analysis highlights the point that while claim language facilitates identifying
the properties of individuals (i.e., embodiments) that are essential to their kind, the practice
of reading a claim on an alleged embodiment, see infra text accompanying notes 94-96,
does not necessarily follow such an approach, nor should it necessarily do so. I do not
81
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In metaphysical terms, the language of each claim corresponds to an
essential sortal. While the definition of a sortal varies,86 a sortal is
commonly understood to provide a criterion of identity for items of a kind.87
Examples of terms that would widely be recognized as sortals include
“person,” “man,” “brick,” “tomato,” “flamingo,”88 “cat,” “dog,”
“mountain,” “star,” and “table.”89 In contrast, as philosopher E.J. Lowe
explains, “red thing” is not considered a sortal because whether or not one
red thing is identical with another does not depend on a single condition
applicable to all red things, but “depends at least in part on what sort or kind
of red things they are — and then the relevant criterion of identity will be
that supplied by the relevant sortal term, be it say, ‘cat,’ ‘apple,’ or ‘star.’”90
As philosopher Penelope Mackie explains more generally:
[I]f ‘C’ is not a sortal term, then the attempt to single
something out as ‘this C,’ ‘that C,’ etc., will fail to determine
what counts as the same individual as the one picked out,
unless some sortal term is implicitly being invoked, in which
case it is the sortal term, and not ‘C,’ that is really doing the
work.91
Mackie defines essential sortals as follows:
A sortal concept S is an essential sortal if and only if the
things that fall under S could not have existed without falling
under S.92
Using terms to individuate things of an artificial kind is not necessarily
straightforward. The term “clock” does not help to explain when a
particular clock loses its original identity in the course of having all of its

argue here to the contrary. My more modest contention is that the language of a claim
always makes an essentialist approach possible, whether or not the applicable doctrine
leads the patent system to take it.
86
See Richard E. Grandy, Sortals, in STANFORD ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sortals/ (surveying characterizations of sortals).
87
See id.; E.J. Lowe, Individuation, in A COMPANION TO METAPHYSICS 28 (Jaegwon
Kim et al. eds. 2009) (“It is commonly said that the key distinction between sortal and
adjectival terms is that while both possess criteria of application, only the former possess
criteria of identity.”); Penelope Mackie, Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties, 44 PHIL.
Q. 311 (1994) (“Although [the notion of a sortal] has been employed in slightly different
ways, a common thread is provided by the idea that sortal concepts have a special role in
individuation: they are concepts that provide criteria of identity or principles of
individuation for the things that fall under them…”).
88
See Mackie, supra note 87, at 311-13.
89
See Lowe, supra note 87, at 30.
90
See id. at 28.
91
See Mackie, supra note 87, at 313.
92
See id.
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parts successively repaired and replaced.93 The patent system, however,
does not concern itself with the persistence of the identity of embodiments
over time. In each of the contexts in which it is necessary for the patent
system to identify individual products or processes to which claim terms
apply— i.e., to determine whether a claim literally “reads on” a given
product or process — there is a single temporal focus. In the interference
context, the relevant time for the “reads on” inquiry is when a party
purports to have actually reduced the claimed invention to practice.94 In an
anticipation analysis, it is the effective date of the prior art reference that
allegedly anticipates the claim.95 And in a proceeding against literal
infringement, it is the date of the challenged conduct involving the accused
device.96 In each of these contexts, the patent system’s inquiry into the
identity of an embodiment is confined to the properties the embodiment
possesses at the relevant time, regardless of any prior or subsequent
changes.
The boundless ability of humans to define and name parts of things can
also complicate the use of sortals to count items of a kind. Consider an
ancient puzzle posed by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus:
Dion, a whole-bodied man, has a proper part, Theon, which
consists of all of Dion except Dion’s left foot. This morning
Dion’s left foot was amputated. If Dion and Theon both
survive there are two material objects coincident in space
and time, and made of the same matter! Which has ceased to
exist? Not Dion — a man can survive the loss of a foot. Not
Theon, which has had no part chopped off.97

93

See David Wiggins, SAMENESS AND SUBSTANCE RENEWED 92 (2001) (“Nor is there
one piece of clock — the spring, the regulator, the escapement, the face, the case ... which
the concept clock could suggest that we should revere as the ‘focus’ or ‘nucleus’ of a clock,
and which can help us past this difficulty.”).
94
See, e.g., Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In an interference
proceeding, a party seeking to establish an actual reduction to practice must [have] ...
constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met every element of the
interference count ...”).
95
See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“[T]he proper framework for challenging the validity of a patent is ... to show that
every element of the patent claims reads on a single prior art reference.”).
96
See, e.g., Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“[A]n accused product literally infringes if every limitation recited in the claim appears in
the accused product, i.e., the properly construed claim reads on the accused product
exactly.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 101, 108 (2005) (“Whether an accused device infringes is tested as of the time of the
alleged infringement.”).
97
Jim Stone, Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus’s Puzzle, 62
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The apparent conclusion that such coincident material objects survive as
numerically distinct entities is unacceptable to many philosophers.98 To
avoid this result, Michael Burke offers the following premises as an
“essentialist solution” to Chrysippus’s puzzle: (1) “the concept of a person
is maximal, that is, that proper parts of persons are not themselves persons”;
(2) “persons are essentially persons (and thus ... nonpersons are essentially
nonpersons)”; (3) the separation from Theon of Dion’s left foot was a
change that would have made Theon a person if Theon survived.99
According to these premises, Theon was essentially a nonperson (i.e., a
proper part of Dion), and therefore could not have survived the separation
from Dion’s foot that would have changed him into a person.100
Burke’s argument is debatable as a solution to Chrysippus’s puzzle,101
but it does provide a coherent account102 that fits the patent system’s
treatment of a claim’s embodiments. As a general matter, the patent system
treats the concept of an embodiment as maximal. Given the claim “A thing
comprising elements A and B,” a thing T consisting solely of extensions of
terms A, B, C and D counts as one embodiment (A+B+C+D), not four (A+B,
A+B+C, A+B+D, A+B+C+D).103 Only the whole thing T falls under the
sortal S corresponding to the claim language, which picks out embodiments
and only embodiments of the claim.
Assuming for the moment that S is an essential sortal, it is
straightforward to identify the essential properties of T within this account,
namely T’s possession of extensions of terms A and B and the lack of
another (i.e., larger) thing comprising extensions of terms A and B, of which
T is a proper part. Note that this is just another way of saying that T is a
complete thing that falls within the literal scope of the claim. Patent law’s
notion of essentiality for elements and limitations that determine the scope
of a claim thus maps naturally onto the metaphysical notion of essentiality
for properties of things falling under the corresponding sortal (i.e.,

ANALYSIS 216, 216 (2002).
98
See id.
99
See Michael Burke, Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle,
90 J. PHIL. 129, 134 (1994).
100
See id. at 135.
101
See Stone, supra note 97, at 216; but see Marta Ujvari, Cambridge Change and
Sortal Essentialism, 5 METAPHYSICA 25 (2004) (defending a reconstructed version of
Burke’s argument).
102
See id. at 216-17 (explaining that his response to Burke “may discourage
philosophers who hope to deploy essentialism against Chrysippus, but it will encourage
those who believe in the viability of sortal essentialism or wish to better understand it”).
103
See FABER, supra note 70, § 2:5, at 2-13 (discussing interpretation of
“comprising”).
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embodiments of the claim). Such essential properties may include causal
powers and other dispositional properties (as I will explain in the next
section).
The patent system is deeply committed to the view that the language of
a claim corresponds to an essential sortal. The patent system does not
entertain the ontological possibility of worlds in which an embodiment of a
claimed invention exists, yet lacks an element of the claim.104 As far as the
patent system is concerned, the embodiments of a claim could not have
existed without falling under the sortal corresponding to the claim language.
A worldview in which it is metaphysically possible for an embodiment of a
claim to come into existence when, and only when, all elements of the claim
are present, might seem strange to many philosophers,105 but it follows
concomitantly from the ontological reading of the predicate “make” that
suffuses patent doctrine.106
In characterizing claim language in this way, I have not distinguished
between product and process claims; and as I will now explain, no such
distinction is necessary. While the discussion thus far has exclusively cited
material objects as examples of things that can fall under a sortal, the
language of a process claim reciting a series of steps can also be recognized
as corresponding to an essential sortal. The items that can fall under such a
sortal are series of events covered by the corresponding process claim,
where each such event is the performance of one of the recited steps. The
patent system regards these events as concrete individual things107 that exist
in time and space.108 Events can thus be accorded the same ontological
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See, e.g., Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 651 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“[W]ithout an actual
reduction to practice there is no invention in existence.”); but cf. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,
Inc., 124 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“reduction to practice is not necessarily a prerequisite
to application of the on-sale bar”).
105
See generally DAVID K. LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (2001) (illustrating the wide
range of metaphysical possibility).
106
See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1372 nn. 5-6
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary definitions of
“make” as “to bring into existence...” and “cause to exist or happen”); Radio Corp. of
America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2nd Cir. 1935) (Swan, J.) (“No wrong is done the
patentee until the combination is formed. His monopoly does not cover the manufacture or
sale of separate elements capable of being, but never actually, associated to form the
invention.”); accord Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972)
(quoting Radio Corp. with approval as “the leading case” on the construction of “make” in
§ 271 of the Patent Act).
107
Cf. Collins, supra note 23, at 501 n. 18 (2008) (using the term “things” to
encompass both objects (products) and events (processes) described by patent claims).
108
See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In
NTP, a patentee asserted method claims that each recited a step that had been performed, if
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status as material objects, at least in their capacity of exemplifying claim
elements.
The treatment of events as particulars coheres with the ontological
worldview of philosopher Donald Davidson.109 According to Davidson,
events have a causal principle of individuation: “events are identical if and
only if they have exactly the same causes and effects.”110 Despite the
apparent strictness of this principle, any form of causal evidence, including
“logic alone, or logic plus physics, or almost anything else … depending on
the descriptions provided,” can establish the identity of an individual
event.111 When this causal evidence is available, Davidson concludes it is
reasonable to describe events as things falling under a sortal,112 inasmuch as
“the individuation of events poses no problems worse in principle than the
problems posed by individuation of material objects.”113 As we will see in
the next section, the patent system’s ontology of “useful Arts” demands
such causal evidence of the embodiments of every claim.114 Process claims
therefore do not raise special ontological problems, provided that
Davidson’s treatment of events is consistent with the patent system’s other
commitments.
B. The Ontological Status of Embodiments
Our conclusion that embodiments exemplify claims immediately
implies that embodiments hold the ontological status of particulars; i.e.,
“something (not necessarily an object) that instantiates but is not itself
instantiated.”115 But the patent system’s ontology of “useful Arts” requires
that embodiments be capable of more than instantiation. For an invention to

at all, only in Canada. See id. at 1318. Holding that “a process cannot be used ‘within’ the
United States as required by section 271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within this
country,” the court found the claims not infringed as a matter of law. See id.
109
See DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 105-203 (2001)
(presenting and defending the position that events are particulars).
110
See id. at 179.
111
See id. at 179-80.
112
See id. (“Individuation at its best requires sorts or kinds that give a principle for
counting. But here again, events come out well enough…”).
113
Id. at 180.
114
See infra text accompanying notes 125-133.
115
E.J. Lowe, The Metaphysics of Abstract Objects, 92 J. PHIL. 509, 518 (1995); see
also Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of
Proprietarian Norms: The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321, 325
(2005) (“What patent law gives is property-like protection on the instantiation of ideas.”);
Jerome T. Tao, Comment, Theories of Computer Program Patentability, 7 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 291, 300 (1991) (restating Pamela Samuelson’s view that
“‘[i]nstantiation’ is defined as the embodiment of the inventive concept.”).
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have operative utility, an invention must be “capable of being used to effect
the object proposed.”116 To have beneficial utility, it must be “capable of
providing some identifiable benefit.”117 Thus, to be included among the
“useful Arts,” an invention must have the capability, or power, to cause “a
beneficial result or effect” when it is used.118 Since to use a claimed
invention is just to use one of its embodiments,119 the utility of a claimed
invention is grounded in the causal powers of the claim’s embodiments.
Our characterization of the ontological status of embodiments therefore
focuses on the patent system’s metaphysical commitments regarding the
nature and role of their causal powers.
1. The Causal Powers of Embodiments
The term causal power is not in the vocabulary of patent law,120 but the
concept is familiar to patent doctrine. As I will use the term, a causal power
is simply a disposition to engage in a process that relates a cause and an
effect.121 That a claim’s embodiments have causal powers follows from the
patent system’s attribution of “a beneficial result or effect” to the use of an
embodiment of the claimed invention; i.e., as a “practicable method or
means of producing” the beneficial effect.122
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to note that the causal powers of

116

Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted).
117
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“An
invention is “useful” under section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable
benefit.”).
118
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 n.7 (1981) (citing Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. 252, 268 (1854) (“It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or
means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted…”); Stifting, 945
F.2d at 1180 (noting the constitutional dimension of the utility requirement).
119
See, e.g., Zenith Electronics Corp. v. PDI Communications Systems, Inc., 522 F.3d
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (explaining that § 102(b) public use bar turns on
“whether the public use related to a device that embodied the invention”); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering
to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of
Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 813-14 (2003) (reasoning that under a plain
meaning interpretation of § 271(a), an infringing use requires “a physical embodiment of
the patented invention”).
120
A search on Westlaw’s Federal Circuit decision (CTAF) database finds no
occurrences of the phrase “causal power.”
121
See BRIAN ELLIS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 48 (2002).
122
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183; cf. 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[2], at 117
(2009) (“In its primary significance, the exclusion of principles and abstract ideas merely
emphasizes the fundamental concept that patents are issued only for new means to achieve
useful results.”).
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a claim’s embodiments may vary, at least to the extent that the use of
certain embodiments, under some or all conditions, might not achieve the
intended purpose of the claimed invention.123 The presence of such
inoperative embodiments within the claim scope need not negate
enablement, however, as long as their number does not “in effect force[]
one of ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the
claimed invention.”124
An enabling patent disclosure explains how to employ the causal
powers of embodiments by “teach[ing] those skilled in the art how to make
and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue
experimentation.”125
Given that every claim has infinitely many
126
embodiments, it is neither necessary nor possible for the disclosure to
provide a specific teaching for every embodiment within the scope of the
claim.127 Patent applicants therefore employ generic disclosures to teach
those skilled in the art how to employ the causal powers of a claim’s
embodiments, and such disclosures are considered sufficient as long as
undue experimentation is not required to achieve operability.128 Each
embodiment within the scope of a generic disclosure possesses certain
causal powers that are employed in using the claim’s embodiments as
taught by the disclosure (even though sometimes those causal powers may
prove insufficient for operability in actual use circumstances). Such causal
powers may be said to be essential to the embodiment, because the
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See In re Dinh-Nguyen, 492 F.2d 856, 858-59 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“It is not a function
of the claims to specifically exclude … possible inoperative substances….”).
124
Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
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Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1391 (2010); Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1168-74;
127
There is no requirement that an enabling patent disclosure provide information
pertaining to the enablement of specific embodiments (i.e., “working examples”). See In re
Long, 368 F.2d 892, 895 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“If by ‘specific embodiment’ is meant a
working example, then the same is not required where sufficient working procedure has
been set forth showing that one skilled in the art may prepare the claimed article without
undue experimentation.”).
128
As the Federal Circuit has explained, despite the lack of specific enabling
information regarding “every possible variant of the claimed invention, … the artisan's
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate
between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments,
depending upon the predictability of the art.” AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac and Ugine, 344
F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(listing factors, including predictability of the art, to be considered in determining whether
a disclosure would require undue experimentation).
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embodiment necessarily possesses them in virtue of being an example of the
kind defined by the claim.129
Even without an explicit description of the cause and effect in question,
a disclosure may be found sufficient to teach one (or more) of the causal
powers employed in practicing an invention, through a theory of inherent
disclosure.130 To show inherency, the effect in question “must inevitably
happen.”131 For this purpose, it is sufficient for the disclosure that the effect
in question is “the natural result flowing from the operation as taught.”132
Causal powers of embodiments that manifest natural dispositions therefore
exist necessarily, insofar as entities possessing such dispositions are
involved in “the operation as taught” and the effects of such causal powers
“must inevitably happen.” Thus the causal laws of nature are necessary in
the metaphysical sense: to say an effect is a natural result necessarily entails
that it is also an inevitable result.133
2. Scientific Essentialism
The patent system’s recognition of essential causal powers in
embodiments and the necessity of laws of nature contrasts with the
129

See Ellis, supra note 121, at 12 (defining “the kind essence of a thing” as “the set of
its properties in virtue of which it is a thing of the kind it is” and subsequently using the
term “essential properties” to refer to “kind essences”).
130
See Pingree v. Hull, 518 F.2d 624, 627-28 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (applying inherency
doctrine in interference context to find enablement by junior party). The inherency
doctrine is more commonly applied in the context of finding teachings in prior art
references. See, e.g., Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
131
See 518 F.2d at 627.
132
See id. at 628 (citing Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212 (C.C.P.A. 1939)).
133
Accord Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“This court …
believes that the laws of thermodynamics do not brook contradiction.”); cf. BRIAN ELLIS,
supra note 121, at 59 (“Essentialists believe that … the laws of nature are metaphysically
necessary, because anything that belongs to a natural kind is logically required (or is
necessarily disposed) to behave as its essential properties dictate.”).
The metaphysical necessity of the natural dispositions of naturally occurring
substances is also implicit in the “purification” doctrine relating to the exclusion of
products of nature from patentable subject matter. An artificially purified form of a
naturally occurring substance will not be found patentable unless it differs “in kind” (and
not merely “in degree”) from the impure form found in nature, see Parke-Davis & Co. v.
H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)
(Learned Hand, J.), and such a difference in kind “will normally be found only if the new
pure compound has an entirely new utility from the old one,” 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 1.02[9] (2010). Thus, where purification alters the essential causal powers of a natural
substance (at least to the extent that it can be used to produce a beneficial result or effect
not manifested in nature), patent doctrine recognizes the existence of a new, non-natural
kind, of which the new pure substance is an example and the old impure substance is not.
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“regularity account” attributed to David Hume, which informs most modern
theories of causation.134 This so-called Humean135 worldview holds that
objects have no essential dispositional properties, the behavior of objects
are completely determined by the laws of nature, laws of nature are
contingent on regularities in the ways objects behave, and causal
relationships are nothing more than connections between logically
independent events.136 Philosopher Brian David Ellis describes the Humean
worldview as “still-dominant,” and refers to it as “passivism,” in that it is
“[t]he view that things in nature are essentially passive, and obedient to
nature’s laws.”137 According to Ellis,
To be a passivist, one must believe that inanimate things are
capable of acting only as directed — depending, for
example, on how they are pushed or pulled around by God,
or by the forces of nature (or, in Hume’s case, by what the
laws of nature happen to be). A passivist therefore believes
that the tendencies of things to behave as they do can never
be inherent in the things themselves. They must always be
imposed on them from the outside. The forces of nature, for
example, are always seen as being external to the objects on
which they act. They act on them, or between them, but the
things themselves are never the source of any activity.138
Since passivism attributes the behavior of embodiments entirely to the
laws of nature, a passivist views every invention as nothing more than the
manifestation of a newly discovered aspect of a law of nature. This
perspective is deeply incompatible with longstanding patentable subject
matter doctrine, which holds that “[p]henomena of nature, though just
discovered … are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work”139 and regards “manifestations of laws of nature” as
134

See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, CAUSAL ASYMMETRIES 36 (1998) (“Hume’s theory is
the starting point for most modern treatments of causation, and the problems his theory
must surmount are problems for all theories of causation.”).
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Compare Alexander Rosenberg, Hume and the Philosophy of Science, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUME 64, 73-78 (David Fate Norton ed. 1993) (describing
Hume’s views that “notions of efficacy or causal power or causal necessity in the objects
are without the requisite pedigree in experience to be meaningful” and that “laws are the
instantiation of contingent regularities whose evidential strength … sustains an attribution
of some sort of necessity to the connections they report”) with TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, HUME AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION 32-37 (1981) (arguing
that Hume himself did not hold these views).
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See ELLIS, supra note 121, at 59-60.
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See id. at 2.
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Id. at 2-3.
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See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
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“free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”140 While patentable
inventions may arise “from the application of [a] law of nature to a new and
useful end,”141 the notion of an embodiment capable of applying a law of
nature to a new and useful end is foreign to passivism. Equally foreign is
the idea that the use of an embodiment of a patentable invention represents
“a practical method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect.”142
If the previous section’s account of the causal powers of embodiments is
more or less accurate, then there is no place for passivism in the patent
system.
The patent system’s worldview also differs from that of classical
(Aristotelian) essentialism, in which everything that exists by nature has an
essential telos, or purpose; i.e., “that for the sake of which a thing …
exists.”143 Patent doctrine contemplates the existence of objects without
essential purposes; it does not “conceive of the world as a grand teleological
system in which the parts exist for the sake of a whole.”144 In granting
patents for the “new use of a known … machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material,”145 the patent system acknowledges that the causal
powers of objects may be made to serve a new purpose. In so doing, the
patent system generally declines to treat the new purpose as an essential
property that can, by itself, distinguish the claimed invention over the prior
art;146 the claimed method of using the old object must also recite a new
manipulative step.147
A patent claim may state “a purpose or intended use” for the invention
in its preamble, but such a stated purpose has no independent status as an
essential property of an embodiment of the claim.148 Preambular language
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2003), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005)); but see Jansen v. Rexall Sundown,
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is considered “essential” (and therefore held to affect claim scope) only to
the extent that it may be found to state “essential structure or steps” of the
claimed invention or to give “life, meaning, and vitality” to a claim that
would otherwise fail meaningfully to define essential structure or steps.149
Accordingly, infringement doctrine does not treat a preambular purpose as
an essential property of a patent claim, because “[i]ntent is not an element
of infringement.”150
By recognizing causal powers but not purposes as essential properties of
embodiments, the patent system appears to be committed to a third
metaphysical worldview, known as scientific essentialism. In the words of
Ellis, who jointly coined the term,151 scientific essentialism holds that “there
are genuine causal powers, capacities, and propensities that … exist in
nature as universals, and are therefore the same in all possible worlds.”152
For example, gravitational mass and charge are properties of an object that
determine its causal role in generating gravitational and electromagnetic
fields, respectively, and hence the effects it has on other objects present in
these fields.153
Scientific essentialism holds that there are natural kinds;154 i.e., kinds
purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation.”); see also
Catalina Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he patentability of apparatus or composition claims depends on the claimed structure,
not on the use or purpose of that structure.”).
149
See, e.g., Vizio, Inc. v. International Trade Com’n, 605 F.3d 1330, 1340-41 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (finding that claims “would have little meaning without the
intended objective” recited in the preamble and that preambular language “does not ‘only
add[] an intended use,’ but rather, states an essential limitation to the claims”); Griffin v.
Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that “diagnosis is … the essence of
this invention” because “its appearance in the count gives ‘life and meaning’ to the
manipulative steps”); see also Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808 (“[C]lear reliance on the preamble
during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the
preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to
define, in part, the claimed invention.”).
150
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir.
1995), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (“Actions
predicated on direct patent infringement, however, do not require any showing of intent to
infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect to damages.”);
Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997) (“Application of the
doctrine of equivalents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither
requires proof of intent.”); see also Kelly, supra note 146, at 333-34 (discussing cases).
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See ELLIS, supra note 81, at 57 n.16.
152
Id. at 48.
153
See id. at 6.
154
See id. at 19 (explaining that “[n]atural kinds clearly have a central place” in the
ontology underlying scientific essentialism).
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that are “independent of human interests, language and epistemic
considerations, and thereby reflect true divisions of the world.”155
Paradigmatic examples of natural kinds include water, electron, and planet,
because these kinds “are out there in the natural world, not just in our way
of thinking about the world.”156 Scientific essentialism holds that scientific
explanations are based at least in part on “postulates concerning the
essential natures of the fundamental natural kinds of objects and processes
occurring in the world.”157 On this view, the task of science “is to discover
what makes a thing the kind of thing it is and hence to explain why it
behaves or has the properties it has.”158 For example, science has
discovered that an electron “has a certain mass and a certain charge
essentially,” and must therefore “generate [certain gravitational and
electromagnetic] fields in any world in which it might exist, and have
precisely the same effects on things of just the same kinds.”159 Because a
disposition to generate these fields is essential to the electron, “[i]f a particle
lacked this causal power, essentialists say, then, whatever else it might be, it
would not be an electron.”160
Consistent with the patent system’s worldview,161 scientific essentialism
holds that “[t]he laws of nature are not contingent, but metaphysically
necessary.”162 This is because laws of nature are simply “descriptions of
natural kinds of processes arising from the intrinsic properties of things
belonging to natural kinds.”163 Thus, “[i]f the laws of nature were different,
the things existing in the world would have to be different,”164 because,
inter alia, their causal powers, capacities and propensities would be
different.165 Electrons would not exist, because nothing would have an
electron’s essential causal powers.166
This is not to say that causal powers cannot vary among different things
of the same kind. While the causal powers and other dispositional
properties of “the “most elementary things” of a natural kind are “fixed by
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their essential natures,” scientific essentialism contemplates variability in
the causal powers of “more complicated things.”167 “One cannot … teach a
copper atom or a proton any new tricks,”168 but the causal powers of a more
complex object may change because of its history or circumstances. For
example, an iron object may become fatigued, and therefore brittle, or
magnetized, and therefore capable of attracting other pieces of iron.169
Furthermore, even when an object (such as a mousetrap spring) actually
possesses a given causal power, the history or circumstances surrounding
the object’s use may affect whether the causal power is manifested as an
intended effect, as Ellis describes:
If the mousetrap is not set off by the taking of the cheese,
then presumably the disturbance was not enough to release
the causal power latent in the spring. Unless there are
extraordinary defeating circumstances, there can be no
question of the catch being released and the mousetrap not
snapping shut.170
Scientific essentialism can therefore account for the potentially wide
variations among the causal powers of embodiments of a given patent claim
and the manifestations of those causal powers as effects.171 Patent claims
are non-natural kinds of relatively complex objects and processes, and the
making of an embodiment may entail introducing changes to the causal
powers of many constituent elements.172 Thus the causal powers of
different embodiments of the same claim may vary, depending on the ways
the causal powers of natural kinds are brought into play and the
circumstances in which each embodiment is made. Because of this
variation in causal powers, some embodiments of a claimed invention may
even be inoperable within the range of circumstances of the invention’s
intended use. Some mousetraps may fail to snap shut when they should —
but it is always possible to build a better one.173
While the causal powers of embodiments may vary widely due to
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embodiment of the claim uses a “magnetized alloy”).
173
But see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966) (noting that due to
advances in the field, “[h]e who seeks to build a better mousetrap today has a long path to
tread before reaching the Patent Office.”).
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complexity and circumstances, scientific essentialism does imply that all
embodiments (and other objects and processes of non-natural kinds) are
ontologically grounded in the fundamental properties that exist in our
world, in the following sense:
All objects and processes that do not belong to natural kinds
depend ontologically on objects and processes that do, since
those very same objects and processes could not exist, or
occur, in any world in which any of the natural kinds of
things of which it is constituted did not exist. Therefore the
kinds of objects and processes that actually exist or occur
could not exist or occur in any possible world except one
with the same fundamental property universals and the same
spatio-temporal-energy structural possibilities as ours.174
According to scientific essentialism, the fundamental dispositional
properties of things in our world and spatio-temporal structure of our world
are manifested in “instances of the most fundamental natural kinds of
processes.”175 By leaving to science the task of identifying and explaining
the natural kinds of processes that actually exist,176 scientific essentialism
entails an epistemological commitment to scientific realism,177 as I will now
discuss.
3. Scientific Realism and Unobserved Embodiments
Scientific realism is “the view that our best scientific theories give
approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable
aspects of a mind-independent world”178 or, in other words, “the doctrine
that scientific theories are to be taken seriously, in particular with respect to
ontological commitment.”179 As an epistemological thesis, scientific
realism holds that “[t]he things our best scientific theories tell us about
entities and processes are decent descriptions of the way the world really
is.”180
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See ELLIS, supra note 81, at 252.
See id. at 217-18.
176
See supra text accompanying note 158.
177
See ELLIS, supra note 81, at 145-46 (explaining that scientific essentialism entails a
form of scientific realism that may appropriately be called “essentialist realism”).
178
ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY, A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM: KNOWING THE
UNOBSERVABLE 212 (2007).
179
Richard Creath, Taking Theories Seriously, 62 SYNTHESE 317, 317 (1985).
180
CHAKRAVARTTY, supra note 178, at 9; see also THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: AN
ENCYLOPEDIA 686 (Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer ed. 2006) (“[Scientific r]ealism takes
175

the explanatory and predictive success of theories to warrant an ontological
commitment to the existence of the entities they posit.”).
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Scientific essentialism’s epistemological commitment to scientific
realism justifies its taking the causal powers of the electron to be real
essences of a natural kind.181 Implicit in scientific essentialism’s view that
“[u]nit charge, unit mass, and spin 1/2 are essential properties of electrons,
and electrons are by their very nature bound to act and interact as these
properties determine,”182 is scientific realism’s view that electrons exist.
While no one has ever directly observed an electron,183 scientific realists
reason that “[i]f the world behaves as if things like atoms and electrons
exist, then the best explanation of this fact is that they really do exist.”184
This appeal to scientific theory185 is often described as the “argument from
the best explanation”186 or “inference to the best explanation.”187
According to Ellis, the argument from the best explanation is the “main
argument” for scientific realism.188
Patent doctrine evidences a strong commitment to scientific realism. As
long as an assertion of a claimed invention’s utility is not “incredible in
light of the knowledge of the art, or factually misleading,” the Patent Office
and the courts do not need to observe an embodiment to satisfy themselves
that embodiments of the claim can exist and be capable of causing the
asserted beneficial effect.189 Accordingly, the Patent Office advises
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See ELLIS, supra note 81, at 54-55.
See id. at 48-49; see also supra text accompanying note 160.
183
See generally THEODORE ARABATZIS, REPRESENTING ELECTRONS: A
BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH TO THEORETICAL ENTITIES (2006) (providing a history of
theoretical representations of the electron as an unobservable entity).
184
See ELLIS, supra note 81, at 146.
185
See supra text accompanying note 180; Creath, supra note 179, at 317 (“If the
theories we adopt say that there are protons or pi-mesons, then we are ontologically
committed to things of these sorts every bit as much as we are ontologically committed to
peanuts and pachyderms by our views at the observational level.”).
186
See ELLIS, THE METAPHYSICS OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM 24 (2009).
187
See Peter Lipton, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 1 (1991) (describing
inference to the best explanation as the practice whereby “[b]eginning with the evidence
available to us, we infer what would, if true, provide the best explanation of that
evidence”).
188
See ELLIS, supra note 186, at 24, 30.
189
See In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d 887, 890 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (citing In re Citron, 325 F.2d
248, 253 (C.C.P.A. 1963)).
Realism about unobserved embodiments has not been a permanent fixture in the patent
system, which required applicants to furnish working models of their inventions, where
possible, between 1836 and 1880. See Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent
Law: 1790-1880 (Part I), 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 187, 187 (1983). A few years before
dispensing with the requirement, Patent Office Commissioner Ellis Spear noted:
It will be necessary only that provision be made for requiring models in
cases where the capability of the machine to operate is called into
182
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examiners:
With the exception of cases involving perpetual motion, a
model is not ordinarily required by the Office to demonstrate
the operability of a device. If operability of a device is
questioned, the applicant must establish it to the satisfaction
of the examiner, but he or she may choose his or her own
way of so doing.190
In advising the public, however, the Patent Office reserves its right to
require a working model:
A working model, or other physical exhibit, may be required
by the Office if deemed necessary. This is not done very
often. A working model may be requested in the case of
applications for patent for alleged perpetual motion
devices.191
Consistent with scientific realism’s epistemological grounding in “the
best explanation” informed by “our best scientific theories,” the patent
system may require proof of utility where there are “factual reasons which
would lead one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the
statement of operability.”192 For example, the “highly unusual nature” of an
invention193 or “considerable doubt” within the scientific community194 may
justify a requirement that the applicant provide proof of utility. Except in
the case of alleged perpetual motion machines,195 such proof does not

question, or where the Examiner is in doubt as to the sufficiency of the
drawings, or where models may be necessary for ready illustration on
appeal, or interference cases.
See Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790-1880 (Part II), 65 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 234, 271 (1983) (emphasis added).
Many issued patent claims expressly recite theoretical entities that would be
unobservable even in a completed embodiment. For example, a search of the Patent
Office’s PatFT database shows that the word “electron” appears in the claims of 49,181
patents. <http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html> (visited March 9, 2011).
190
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 608.03 (July 2010) [hereinafter “MPEP”].
191
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/> (January 2005).
192
In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 1224 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
193
See In re Houghton, 433 F.2d 820 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
194
See In re Dash, 118 Fed. Appx. 488 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 346
(2005) (unpublished opinion); cf. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
(dicta) (stating that unpredictability of chemical reactions may create reasonable doubt as
to enablement where a broad representation “is, on its face, contrary to generally accepted
scientific principles.”).
195
See supra text accompanying notes 190-191.
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necessarily require the demonstration of a working model196 or a correct
account of the invention’s theory of operation,197 but must convince one
skilled in the art of the asserted utility.198 If an applicant does rely on
scientific theories to show operability, the theories must be part of the
“knowledge of the art,”199 and one of skill in the art must be able to
recognize that the theories are applicable to the claimed invention.200
My description of the patent system’s ontology thus far has
characterized the ontological status of claims and their embodiments under
settled patent doctrine. Claims are non-natural kinds with corresponding
essential sortals; embodiments are particulars that have essential causal
powers in virtue of being examples of those kinds and falling under those
sortals. Operative embodiments have utility in virtue of their essential
causal powers. Other embodiments of the same claim also have these
essential causal powers, but may be inoperative due to wide variations in
causal powers and in the history or circumstances of reduction to practice
and use. When a claim is filed, typically none of the embodiments
described by the claim is observable to the patent system. Nevertheless, the
patent system is committed to scientific essentialism and scientific realism,
and therefore accepts that operative embodiments of a claim can exist,
without knowledge or observation of the actual existence of any such
entities, based on an argument from the best explanation.
As an indispensable guide to the interpretation of claim language,201 and
as a statement of facts about the potential and actual existence of
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See supra note 190 and accompanying text; see also In re Houghton, 433 F.2d at
821 (noting that Patent Office did not require working model as proof of utility).
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See Newman v. Quigg, 77 F.2d 1575, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
198
See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
199
See supra text accompanying note 189; see also BlackLight Power, Inc. v. Rogan,
295 F.3d 1269, 1271 (holding that Patent Office’s withdrawal of patent from issuance was
not unreasonable in light of examining group director’s determination that “the applicant
was claiming the electron going to a lower orbital in a fashion that I knew was contrary to
the known laws of physics and chemistry”); In re Houghton, 433 F.2d at 821 n.1 (finding
applicant’s reliance on published articles purporting to provide theoretical support for
invention “not persuasive” where “most of these articles were authored by appellant, and
none of them appear in the record”).
200
See In re Houghton, 433 F.2d at 821 (finding claimed hovercraft inoperable where
applicant “presented no evidence from any skilled persons other than himself to show that
such persons would be convinced for the practical applicability of the [disclosed
aerodynamic] equations to a flying machine”); cf. In re Gazave, 379 F.2d at 978 (citation
omitted) (where a claimed device is of “such a nature that it could not be tested by any
known scientific principles … it is incumbent on the applicant to demonstrate the
workability and utility of the device and make clear the principles on which it operates”).
201
See supra text accompanying note 31.
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embodiments and kinds of embodiments, the specification of a filed patent
application plays a vital role in incurring and warranting ontological
commitments to claims and their embodiments. In the next Part, I
undertake to show how the patent specification’s ontological role serves in
part to explain the complexity of the demands put upon it by patent law’s
adequate disclosure doctrines.
III. THE ONTOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
A. Written Description as a Definitional Requirement
The complexity of the patent system’s demand for adequate disclosure
is apparent from the fact that a simple set-theoretic inquiry as to whether all
embodiments within the claim are enabled will not suffice.202 This is not
only because every claim contains some non-enabled subject matter,203 but
also because a claim’s embodiments may be adequately enabled even
though its scope bears no relation to what the inventor actually invented.204
In his 2008 article The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement,205 Jeffrey Lefstin persuasively shows that the written
202

See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1159-67 (contrasting enablement doctrine with other
patent doctrines that he says are amenable to a set-theoretic characterization). For
example, if we “[t]ake a claim reciting particular properties, and call the set of all possible
things or events characterized by those properties as x,” and “[l]et y be the set of all things
the accused infringer has made, used, sold, or offered for sale within the United States,”
then “[t]he claim is infringed if and only if x and y intersect” as shown in the figure below.

Id. at 1159-60.
203
See id. at 1175 (“Due to the infinite scope of patent claims, a patentee certainly
need not, and in most cases cannot, enable every embodiment falling within the ‘full scope’
of the claims.”); see supra text accompanying notes 123-124.
204
See id. at 1194 (emphasis omitted). For example, Lefstin points out that the
following claim would be enabled: “All material objects which are enabled by the prior art,
excluding those which are known or obvious in light of the prior art.” Id. at 1182-85.
205
See Lefstin, supra note 29.
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description requirement brings needed coherence to the adequate disclosure
inquiry by providing a legal test directed to “the scope of the claim itself”
rather than “a particular embodiment or collection of embodiments.”206
Specifically, Lefstin interprets the written description requirement as a
demand that the disclosure provide adequate “definitional information”
concerning the scope of the claim.207
According to Lefstin, the Federal Circuit provided guidance regarding
the written description’s definitional function in its 1997 Lilly decision.208
Prior to Lilly, it was widely believed that originally-filed patent claims
adequately described their own subject matter, so that the written
description requirement served solely to prohibit the later claiming of new
matter added during prosecution.209 In Lilly, however, the Federal Circuit
held invalid an originally filed claim directed to a microorganism modified
to contain human insulin-encoding cDNA.210 The specification disclosed “a
process for obtaining human insulin-encoding cDNA” and “the amino acid
sequence of the human insulin A and B chains,” but gave “no further
information … pertaining to that cDNA’s relevant structural or physical
characteristics.”211 The court found that the disclosure did not provide a
written description of the cDNA, and went on to explain what an adequate
description would “usually” entail:
[A] cDNA is not defined or described by the mere name
“cDNA,” even if accompanied by the name of the protein
that it encodes, but requires a kind of specificity usually
achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of
nucleotides that make up the cDNA. A description of a
genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of
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See id.
See id. at 1217.
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Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
209
See Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger? A
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and
PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 6 (2007); but see Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1200-02
(citing WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 484
(1890)) (noting that Robinson’s “monumental and influential 1890 treatise” recognized a
written description requirement separate from the enablement requirement for original
claims); Zhibin Ren, Note, Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written Description
Requirement and Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Company, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 1297, 1312 (1999) (“Although prior to Lilly the written description
requirement had been used exclusively to prevent later-claims from obtaining an earlier
priority date, the court never expressly closed the door on applying the written description
requirement to originally filed claims.”).
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119 F.3d at 1567 (paraphrase in original).
211
Id.
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a representative number of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide
sequence, falling within the scope of the genus or of a
recitation of structural features common to the members of
the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of
the genus.212
Departing from the majority of Lilly’s commentators who “have focused
on the Federal Circuit’s demand for structure or sequence information,”213
Lefstin interprets the court’s language as a call for definitional information
about the claimed genus.214 He notes that the two descriptive approaches
suggested by the court “correspond perfectly to the two modes of
definition” presented in Peter Coffey’s classic text The Science of Logic215;
i.e., definition by intension and definition by type.216 Definition by intension
involves “specifying the proximate genus to which it belongs, and those
properties which differentiate it from other members of the genus.”217 As
Coffey writes, differentiating properties “are intended as much to be
diagnostic — i.e., features by which a species may be identified — as to
declare the essential nature of the species.”218 Definition by type “proceeds
by designating some individual or group of individuals as central or typical
members of the genus and determining membership in the genus by degree
of resemblance.”219 According to Coffey, the “perfect” definition by type
of a class of things consists of an “exemplification” of the class by a smaller
group of individuals220 such that “the class exemplified does possess in
common those attributes, those only, possessed in common by the smaller
group.”221
Lefstin argues that by requiring a claimed genus to be defined by one of
these approaches, Lilly’s written description requirement “anchor[s] claim
scope within the hierarchy of definitional genera.”222 For example, Lilly
itself is concerned with locating claims amidst a hierarchy of successfully
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narrower genera consisting of “DNA,” “vertebrate DNA,” “vertebrate
insulin DNA,” “mammalian insulin DNA,” “rat insulin DNA,” and some
“particular variant of rat insulin DNA.”223 According to Lefstin, an
inventor who discovers and discloses only rat insulin DNA may claim “rat
insulin DNA” but not “vertebrate insulin DNA,” because the inventor’s
disclosure defines the broader genus “neither by properties that distinguish
it from other genera, nor by a set of types by which the genus can be
recognized by degrees of resemblance.”224 Thus conceived as an “anchor[]”
of claim scope, the written description requirement performs at least two
needed functions: “more precisely defin[ing] the boundaries of the
patent,”225 and providing a way for “the disclosure of the invention [to]
become a more significant source of definitional information” in keeping
with its increasingly vital role in claim construction.226
In the course of proposing his definitional account of the written
description requirement, Lefstin rejects the Federal Circuit’s explanation of
the requirement as a rule that the applicant must demonstrate “possession of
the invention” as of the filing date.227 Lefstin essentially accuses the court
of a category error,228 reasoning that “[i]t is not syntactically sensible to ask
whether an inventor ‘invented’ or ‘possessed’ an abstract bundle of
properties defining a legally cognizable right.”229 As I argue below,230
however, the Federal Circuit’s “possession” jurisprudence, which the court
pointedly reaffirmed in Ariad Pharmaceuticals (2010),231 is neither
metaphysically erroneous nor incompatible with Lefstin’s definitional
account. I am inclined to accept that the written description requirement
serves both functions.
I find Lefstin’s other arguments convincing and his ontological
perspectives on claim scope insightful, though ultimately incomplete.
Lefstin persuasively demonstrates that the enablement requirement cannot
alone define the scope of patent claims, and that the written description
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See id. at 1220-21.
227
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Cir. 1991)).
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Id. at 1199.
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See infra section III.C.2.
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2010) (en banc).
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requirement serves in part to provide this definitional function. But Lefstin
does not explore how the patent system confers ontological status upon
inventions and embodiments under the doctrine of constructive reduction to
practice. The issue of ontological commitment does not arise in Lefstin’s
analysis, because nothing in his incomplete account of patent doctrine
entails that claims and embodiments have any particular status in the patent
system’s ontology.
Lefstin is careful in his ontological description of patent claims, as far as
he goes. He notes that many of patent law’s doctrines, including
infringement, anticipation, nonobviousness and utility, can be described
using the set-theoretic concepts of intersection and containment,232 but finds
that the enablement standard cannot be so characterized, because the nature
of the patent claim “makes patent law not reducible to a simple set-theoretic
system.”233 He accurately concludes that the “ontological nature of patent
claims” is that they are classes having infinite scope.234 But Lefstin’s
analysis does not entail that the patent system be ontologically committed to
the existence of claims as either set-entities or class-entities. The
intersection and containment relationships he employs can be adequately
expressed without ontological commitment to sets or classes, by
characterizing claims as mereological sums or fusions of their embodiments
(and embodiments as parts of claims).235 For example, making a collection
of things y infringes claim x iff there is an embodiment z that is both a part
of x and a part of y; in other words, there is an overlap between x and y,236
or x shares parts with y.237 On this reading, an adequate written description
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ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 318 (Edward Craig ed. 1998)
(defining mereology as “the theory of the part-whole relation” that “tak[es] the part-whole
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scope to the embodiments that make up the claim. See supra text accompanying note 44
(“[T]he number of existing embodiments of a patent claim has no effect on the claim’s
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performs its definitional function by picking out the embodiments whose
fusion is the claim, thereby determining the claim’s (infinite) scope.238
Such a mereological account need not be taken to entail any ontological
commitment to claims beyond that already provided to their
embodiments.239
Lefstin’s account of patent doctrine is sufficient, and indeed well suited,
to support his central thesis that the written description requirement has a
necessary function in limiting claim scope; however, it misses the adequate
disclosure requirements’ more fundamental roles in connection with
incurring and warranting ontological commitments to claims and
embodiments. In the two sections that follow, I will explain how these roles
not only subsume both the definitional and “possession” conceptions of the
written description requirement, but also critically illuminate the patent
system’s ontology of “useful Arts.”
B. Ontological Commitments in Patent Discourse
In the metaphysics literature, a theorist is said to incur an ontological
commitment if she is committed to acknowledging an entity’s existence in
virtue of her acceptance of the truth of a given theory.240 The theorist’s
warrant for this commitment is the set of facts she takes to justify such an
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UNIVERSALS AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM v. 2, at 36-38 (1978); Donald L.M. Baxter, Identity
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See E.J. LOWE, A SURVEY OF METAPHYSICS 215 (2002) (defining criterion of
ontological commitment as “a principle which will reliably tell us what kinds of entities a
theorist is committed to acknowledging as existent, in virtue of his acceptance of the truth
of a given theory”).

THE ONTOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE PATENT DOCUMENT 41
assertion of the entity’s existence.241
An ontological commitment may be de dicto or de re. A de dicto
commitment is to be understood as a proposition about a state of affairs,
while a de re commitment is understood to refer to a specific entity.242 As
Michael Jubien explains, a de dicto commitment to a particular holds that
the truth of a theory implies the existence of some unique entity, but does
not per se restrict the identity of this entity to a “particular particular.”243
For example, the truth of a theorem that “there is a unique president at a
given moment in 1972” incurs a commitment to the existence of exactly one
president at that moment in time, but does not by its terms incur a
commitment to the existence of Richard Nixon at that time.244 In contrast, a
de re commitment to a particular implies the existence of a specific entity.
A theorem stating that “there is an x such that x=c,” where c is a constant
interpreted as referring to Richard Nixon would incur such a
commitment.245
Analogously, a de dicto commitment to a kind takes the form “The
theory is committed to the existence of (possible) objects of a given kind,”
in contrast to a de re commitment, which essentially states “There are
certain (possible) objects of a given kind to which the theory is
committed.”246 As Jubien notes, a de re commitment to a kind is equivalent
to a de re commitment to certain particulars of the kind.247
The decisions and actions of legal institutions, including the Patent
Office and the courts, are premised on facts and theories that such
institutions take to be true in law, whether or not known to be true in fact.248
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Accordingly, the patent system may be said to incur ontological
commitments to claims and embodiments whenever it engages in legally
operative discourse predicated on the existence of such entities. Such
discourse reveals the patent system’s criteria of ontological commitment. A
criterion of ontological commitment is “a principle for determining just
what objects or entities a theory says there are (or what entities must exist in
order for a theory to be true).” 249 The warrants for the patent system’s
ontological commitments are the facts taken by the patent system to be
legally sufficient to justify its decisions and actions arising from the
discourse in question. By this account, the patent system appears to incur
ontological commitments to patent claims and embodiments in at least three
situations.
First, under the doctrine of constructive reduction to practice, the
disclosure of an invention in a filed patent application is given the same
legal effect as a finding that the patent specification is a true description of
existing kinds of entities with essential causal properties; i.e., the claim
exists as a kind whose examples include (possible) embodiments,250 and any
specifically disclosed embodiments exist as particulars.251 The patent
system thereby incurs a de dicto ontological commitment to the claim as a
kind,252 de re ontological commitments to any specifically disclosed actual
embodiments as particulars, and de dicto ontological commitments to any
specifically disclosed prophetic embodiments as particulars.253 Each of

another sense — it is true in law.”).
249
CYNTHIA MACDONALD, VARIETIES OF THINGS: FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY
METAPHYSICS 25 (2005).
250
See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“The patent law authorizes that an invention may be constructively reduced to
practice by filing a patent application, whether the embodiments were actually made or are
constructed in the patent application.”).
251
A priority determination in the interference context may be predicated on the
constructive reduction to practice of a specifically disclosed embodiment. See, e.g., Hunt
v. Treppschuh, 523 F.2d 1386, 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (explaining that support of a count
requires “disclosure of an embodiment within the count that meets the requirements of the
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112”).
252
See supra note 127 (explaining that support for a claim need not include support for
actual embodiments); cf. Jubien, supra note 246 at 88-89 (for a kind that is a natural kind
or species, suggesting approach of using “a species-term” to refer to “the (possible) species
it would correctly pick out if the relevant parts of the story were true reports of the accurate
observations of a naturalist (if such a species exists).”).
253
A prophetic (or paper) example “describe[s] the manner and process of making an
embodiment of the invention which has not actually been conducted.” MPEP, supra note
190, at § 608.01(p). Under the doctrine of constructive reduction to practice, a prophetic
example is given same the same legal effect as a finding of the existence of a specific
embodiment enabled by the example, even though no particular embodiment of that sort
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these commitments is warranted by the adequacy of the filed disclosure
under the first paragraph of § 112 with respect to the claim or embodiment
in question.254
Second, when a claim is found anticipated by use255 or prior reduction to
practice under § 102(a),256 or barred by public use or on-sale activity under
§ 102(b),257 it is because the patent system has affirmed the existence of a
specific embodiment of the claim prior to the invention or the critical date
(or its constructive equivalent in another inventor’s patent application258).
The patent system incurs a de re ontological commitment to the prior art
embodiment referred to in the evidentiary finding (as in “x was in public use
more than a year before the filing date”), which is warranted by clear and
convincing evidence of direct experience of a particular that is an example
of the claim.259
Finally, when a claim is found infringed under § 271(a), it is because the
patent system has affirmed the existence of a specific embodiment of the
claim that was made, used, offered for sale, sold or imported by the

can be identified. See Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“To fulfill their legal purpose, [prophetic]
examples must be enabling of specific embodiments…. The patent law authorizes that an
invention may be constructively reduced to practice by filing a patent application, whether
the embodiments were actually made or are constructed in the patent application.”).
254
See 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.05[5], at 10-162 (“In order to constitute
constructive reduction to practice as of its filing date, the application must comply with the
requirements of the first paragraph of Section 112.”).
255
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (denying patentability where the claimed “invention was …
used by others in this country … before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent”);
256
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (denying patentability if the claimed invention was made
earlier by the other party in an interference, or made earlier in the United States by another
inventor, and not abandoned, suppressed or concealed).
An applicant who is first to reduce to practice may also lose priority to another
inventor who is first to conceive and diligent in reducing to practice. See id. In such a
case, no ontological commitment to a prior embodiment of the claim is incurred.
257
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (denying patentability where the claimed “invention was …
in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States);
258
See Frazer v. Schlegel, 498 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (“When
interference priority is at issue, constructive reduction to practice of a count may be
established by disclosure of an embodiment within the count.”).
259
See Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 605 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted) (“[T]he party asserting invalidity due to anticipation must prove
anticipation, a question of fact, by clear and convincing evidence.”); Netscape
Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“A conclusion
that a section 102(b) bar invalidates a patent must be based on clear and convincing
evidence.”)
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defendant.260 The patent system incurs a de re ontological commitment to
the infringing embodiment, which is warranted by the preponderance of
evidence of past or present direct experience of a particular that is an
example of the claim.
If the above inventory is basically correct, then the patent system’s
ontological commitments to claims and embodiments are grounded in either
(1) adequate disclosure in a filed patent application or (2) a proven report of
past or present direct experience. Moreover, given that proven reports of
direct experience would be acceptable ontological warrants even in a
minimal legal epistemology,261 it is patent law’s doctrines of adequate
disclosure that determine the overall extent of the patent system’s
ontological commitments to claims and embodiments.
It is costly for the patent system to incur ontological commitments to
claims and embodiments.262 The filing of a claim in a patent application is
a demand that the patent system not only admit a new kind into its ontology
of “useful Arts,” but regulate the creation, use and sale of all entities within
its jurisdiction that are examples of the kind.263 As I will now argue, patent
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Cf. Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting
that “infringement without a completed infringing embodiment is not the norm in patent
law” but is contemplated by statutory provisions beyond the scope of § 271(a)).
261
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note (citation omitted) (“‘[T]he
rule requiring that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses
must have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a
‘most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable
sources of information.’”); Joseph Boyle, Free Choice, Incommensurable Goods and the
Self-Refutation of Determinism, 50 AM. J. JUR. 139, 157 (2005) (“[I]t may be possible to
stand back epistemologically from one’s assent, but seeing an event, or remembering a
recent event, you just believe the proposition describing it, and reasonably so. There seems
to be no choice in the matter.”).
Of course, the patent system does not accept all reports of direct experience as proof of
existence, see, e.g., Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (rejecting “uncorroborated oral testimony … of interested persons recalling long-past
events” regarding prior use of patented method). In admitting reports of direct experience
as evidence of existence, however, the patent system rejects a posture of universal
skepticism toward sensory experience and memory, such as that expressed in René
Descartes’s Meditations. Compare FED. R. EVID. 602 (“Evidence to prove personal
knowledge may … consist of the witness' own testimony.”) with RENÉ DESCARTES,
MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 51 (Donald A. Cress ed. 1996) (“[E]verything I ever
thought I sensed while awake I could believe I also sometimes sensed while asleep”).
262
See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 38-45 (2008)
(describing costs of defining new property rights).
263
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (granting the patentee “the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States” during the patent term).
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law’s written description doctrine serves in part to provide limiting criteria
for the patent system’s ontological commitments to claims.
C. Written Description as a Doctrine of Ontological Possession
A comprehensive analysis of the patent system’s criteria of ontological
commitment to claims as kinds is beyond the scope of this Article.264 It is
sufficient here to argue as a more general matter that any kind that is the
subject of ontological commitment must pick out a definite (possibly
empty) class of examples. As philosopher Michael Jubien describes this
proposition,265 this is “a very modest and natural assumption about kinds —
one that I think would be met by any plausible philosophical doctrine on the
nature of kinds.”266 Jubien himself relies on this assumption in formulating
a criterion of de dicto ontological commitment to kinds267 suitable for
theories in which kinds may stand in definitional hierarchies.268
By this account, the patent system’s criteria of ontological commitment
subsume Lefstin’s definitional account of the written description
requirement.
According to Lefstin, the standard for the written
description’s definitional function is to be found in the Federal Circuit’s
Lilly decision, which characterizes “a fully described genus” as one that
allows “one skilled in the art … [to] visualize or recognize the identity of
the members of the genus.”269 A claim that is “fully described” according
to this standard is one that can be the subject of ontological commitment, as
one skilled in the art can recognize (and therefore pick out) the
embodiments of the claim, which form a definite class of examples.
This reinterpretation of Lefstin’s account also plausibly explains the
Federal Circuit’s characterization of the written description requirement as
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Cf. Jubien, supra note 246, at 85 (noting that his explanation of ontological
commitment to kinds is “not self-contained,” but relies on “technical notions introduced” in
a previous article).
265
See id. at 85 (stating the assumption more formally as “for any kind κ , there exists
in every world a definite (possibly empty) class of objects of that kind” and denoting the
class of objects of kind κ in world H by {x | κx}H ).
266
267

See id.
More formally, Jubien states the criterion as follows: “

objects of kind
in which
268

κ

iff for every

T , I is committed to

I u (H ) -model M, D( M ) ∩ {x | κx}H ≠ Ø for every H

Tu , I u is true.” See id. at 87.

See id. at 86. (“The criterion we seek should satisfy the condition that if a theory is
committed to objects of kind κ , and if objects of kind κ are necessarily also of kind κ ′ ,
then the theory is committed to objects of kind κ ′ as well.”).
269
Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1206 (citing Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568).
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an obligation that the applicant show “that, as of the filing date sought, he
or she was in possession of the invention.”270 To Lefstin, the Federal
Circuit’s “possession” jurisprudence makes no sense, because “‘the
invention’ is a bundle of properties recited by the claims, defining the
perimeter of the patentee’s legal right to exclude”: it may be meaningful to
ask whether an inventor possessed certain “ideas and things,” but not
“abstract legal entities or infinite sets of subject matter.”271 Since Lilly,
however, the court has continued to frame the written description
requirement as a possession inquiry,272 including in its recent en banc
decision in Ariad.273
Lefstin sees in this recent caselaw a missed opportunity to follow Lilly’s
lead in clarifying that the “true role of the written description doctrine” was
in requiring definitional information rather than a showing of possession.274
But Lilly need not be read as a departure from the Federal Circuit’s
“possession” jurisprudence. In Lilly, the court refers to its opinion four
months earlier in Lockwood v. American Airlines275 for what it takes to be
the definitive statement of the written description requirement: “To fulfill
the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe an
invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly
conclude that ‘the inventor invented the claimed invention.’”276 The
Lockwood court, in turn, finds that it is “accurate[]” to say that the
requirement is met by a “show[ing] that one is ‘in possession’ of the
invention,”277 and goes on to explain what such a showing entails:
270

See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For
other commentary challenging this characterization, see, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts
Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly
Patent Disclosure Doctrines, 2 WASH. U.J. L. & POL’Y 55, 62 (2000) (arguing that the
written description requirement is “an essentially standardless disclosure doctrine that can
be deployed arbitrarily”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L.
REV. 123, 161-63 (2006) (arguing that the written description requirement should not be
used to ensure possession, as that function is better performed by the enablement
requirement).
271
See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1199.
272
See id. at 1210 & n. 220 (citing cases).
273
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (“[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application
relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession
of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”).
274
See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1207-10.
275
Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
276
See Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (citing Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572).
277
See Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572 (citing Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64)
(“Lockwood argues that all that is necessary to satisfy the description requirement is to
show that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention. Lockwood accurately states the test….”).
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One shows that one is “in possession” of the invention by
describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not
that which makes it obvious. (“[T]he applicant must also
convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date
sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The
invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry,
whatever is now claimed.”) One does that by such
descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams,
formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention.278
The effect of this explanation is to read into the language preceding the
patent claims (e.g., “I claim”279) a further predicate of the form “I am now
in possession of.” Under a standard interpretation, the speaker of such a
predicate (i.e., the patent applicant) incurs an ontological commitment to
each entity that is an object of the predicate: one can possess only what
exists. By our account above, the written description requirement serves to
ensure that the claims are kinds that pick out well-defined classes,280 as is
necessary to satisfy the patent system’s criteria of ontological commitment.
On this interpretation, to “possess” a claimed invention is to possess the
claim as a kind in one’s ontology, having incurred a de dicto281 ontological
commitment to the claim according to the patent system’s criteria for such
commitment. The filing of a patent application that meets the written
description requirement serves to “convey” this ontological commitment “to
those skilled in the art” who read the application, insofar as a reader’s
acceptance of the truth of the patent specification (including the applicant’s
representations of possession) implies the existence of the claims as kinds
whose examples include (possible) working embodiments.
Whatever the inventor’s criteria of ontological commitment may be, the
written description requirement ensures that the patent disclosure convey
ontological commitment to a reader according to the patent system’s criteria
for such commitment. Every such reader is entitled to “possess” the
invention in this ontological sense.282 By demonstrating ontological
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107 F.3d at 1572 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
See supra text accompanying note 70.
280
See supra text accompanying note 269.
281
In this case, the entities are kinds to which the patent system incurs only a de dicto
and not a de re ontological commitment. See supra text accompanying note 252. Since the
language of the patent application need convey no more than a de dicto commitment to
these kinds, the applicant need incur only a de dicto commitment in making the application.
282
Cf. In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 855 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (holding that for the teachings of
a prior art patent to anticipate a claimed invention, “the [prior art] disclosure must be such
as will give possession of the invention to the person of ordinary skill.”). Since such
ontological possession includes knowledge of claim scope, this account also recognizes the
279
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possession of the claimed and described invention at the time of filing,
however, the inventor is uniquely entitled to establish priority for the filed
claims. (The written description requirement’s role in securing ontological
commitment thus also subsumes the requirement’s traditional role in
policing against the addition of new matter.283) Upon securing priority in
this way and meeting the other requirements for patentability, the inventor
is awarded an entitlement to regulate the ontological possession of future de
re commitments to the claim and its embodiments; i.e., by excluding others
from bringing into existence any embodiments that might be the subject of
such commitments. On this reading, then, the patent right does not include
an exclusive right to “possess” the claimed invention, but does include the
most important of the “sticks” in the property rights “bundle”: the right to
exclude others.284
In summary, I have provided an ontological account of the written
description requirement that both incorporates Lefstin’s definitional account
and supports the Federal Circuit’s “possession” jurisprudence. In this
account, the written description requirement serves to ensure that one who
reads the applicant’s claims in light of the specification thereby incurs de
dicto ontological commitments to those claims according to the patent
system’s criteria for such commitments. I will now turn to an account of
the enablement requirement as providing the complementary function of
ensuring that any ontological commitments so incurred are warranted
according to the patent system’s epistemology.
IV. THE ONTOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT
To complete our account of the patent system’s ontological
commitments, it remains to show how the enablement requirement secures

notice function of the written description requirement. Cf. Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1219
(arguing that by demanding definitional information, the written description requirement
improves notice of patent scope).
283
See, e.g., In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that laterfiled claims can claim the priority date of an earlier application only if the earlier
application’s disclosure “reasonably convey[s] to one of ordinary skill in the art that the
inventors possessed the later-claimed subject matter when they filed the earlier
application”).
284
Cf. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (citation omitted) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is
the right to exclude others. That is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property.’”); Aleksandar Nikolic, Securitization of
Patents and Its Continued Viability In Light of the Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 393, 395-96 (2009) (“While a patent is considered property, an owner is
not granted the full ‘bundle of sticks’ of property rights in an invention but merely ‘the
[negative] right to exclude others.’”).
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warrants to de dicto ontological commitments to claims as kinds; i.e., how
an enabling disclosure serves to justify (according to the patent system’s
epistemology) the belief that entities of the claimed kind, having certain
essential causal properties, may exist in this world. To understand what an
enabling disclosure needs to do to fulfill this justificatory role, it is
necessary first to examine the epistemological burdens such a belief places
on the patent system. In particular, the enforceability of a patent claim
requires that the patent system have available sufficient epistemological
machinery to make factual determinations as to whether a given accused
entity exists and is of the claimed kind.
These determinations may involve extensive appeals to scientific
realism, as Centricut v. Esab Group285 illustrates. In that case, Esab Group
(“Esab”) asserted two patent claims directed to an improved electrode for a
plasma arc torch.286 Centricut sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity
and noninfringement against Esab, and Esab filed infringement
counterclaims.287 After a bench trial,288 the district court held one of Esab’s
claims infringed.289 The Federal Circuit reversed the trial court’s finding of
infringement, relying heavily on the testimony of Centricut’s expert that
Esab had not conducted testing sufficient to show that the accused electrode
fell within the scope of the claim.290 In giving weight to this expert
testimony, the appeals court discounted the rebuttal testimony of Esab’s
inventor and other witnesses, none of whom were qualified as experts.291
The Federal Circuit based its decision on the following facts. Plasma
arc torches use electrical arcs — essentially, artificial lightning bolts292 —to
superheat a stream of gas to a plasma state at temperatures of around 30,000
degrees Kelvin, hot enough to cut metal.293 Torches that use oxygen gas are
particularly suitable for cutting carbon steel.294 Most conventional torch
electrodes consist of a metal emissive insert embedded in a holder made of
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Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 814 (2005).
286
See id. at 1363.
287
See id.
288
See id. at 1365.
289
See id. at 1366-67.
290
See id. at 1367-68.
291
See id. at 1368-69.
292
See, e.g., KATHRYN D. WAGNER, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN
HEALTHCARE FACILITIES 34 (1998) (“Plasma Arc reactors generate intense heat … through
discharge of a powerful electrical arc (artificial lightning).”).
293
See id. at 1363.
294
See id.
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a different metal.295
According to Esab’s patent disclosure, the emissive insert is composed
of a metal that has a low “work function”; i.e., the amount of energy
required to “permit[] thermionic emission of [an electron from] a metal at a
given temperature.”296 This low work function makes the insert “capable of
readily emitting electrons when an electric potential is applied thereto,” so
that in the torch’s normal operation the arc is supported by the insert.297 In
conventional torches, however, the use of oxygen gas can cause the metal
holder to oxidize.298 If the holder is made of a metal such as copper whose
work function falls when it is oxidized, the arc may begin to emanate from
the holder in preference to the insert, causing the holder to melt and the
electrode to fail.299 Esab’s invention provides a sleeve positioned between
the insert and the holder that has a high work function relative to the
emissive insert.300 The addition of the sleeve keeps the arc on the emissive
insert even when the holder becomes oxidized, thereby prolonging the
electrode’s life.301
Claim 1, the broader of Esab’s claims recited, inter alia, “an emissive
insert composed of a metallic material having a relatively low work
function, and a sleeve surrounding said emissive insert … composed of a
metallic material having a work function which is greater than that of the
material of said emissive insert.”302 Esab’s other claim, claim 8, further
specified, inter alia, that the sleeve’s work function was greater than that of
the holder and that the insert’s “relatively low work function” adapted it “to
readily emit electrons upon an electric potential being applied thereto.”303
In the district court, Centricut moved for summary judgment of
invalidity for indefiniteness, arguing that the work function of a metallic
material is dependent on too many variables (e.g., surface treatment and
crystalline structure) for one of skill in the art to determine whether either
claim read on a particular combination of holder, sleeve and insert
materials.304 The court rejected this argument, finding the claims’ work
function limitation to be definite:
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See id.
See U.S. Patent No. 5,023,425, col. 1 (issued June 11, 1991).
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See id.
298
See id.
299
See id.
300
See Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1363-64.
301
See id. at 1364.
302
See id.
303
See id. at 1364 n.1.
304
Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., No. 99-039-M, 2002 WL 220057, at *4
(D.N.H. 2002).
296
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It may well be, as Centricut claims, that some silver sleeves
could be within the claims while others silver sleeves fall
outside the claims, depending upon the physical
characteristics of the particular sample of silver used and the
identity of the metal used for the emissive insert, but that is
not due to any indefiniteness in the claim. Rather, it is due to
the nature of work function as an electro-chemical
characteristic that is dependent upon a variety of variables….
[A]ll one must do to make a silver [sleeve] that avoids the
work-function limitation… is to use silver with the necessary
physical characteristics (surface treatment, crystalline
structure, etc.) to give it a work function equal to or lower
than the work function of the material selected for the
emissive insert….305
In Centricut’s accused electrode, the holder was made of copper, the
sleeve was made of silver, and the insert was made of hafnium.306 At trial,
Centricut’s expert had submitted tables providing work function values for
various element samples, including one that reported values ranging from
3.08 to 4.81 electron-volts for silver and a single value of 3.53 electronvolts for hafnium.307 The district court inferred from these tables that
“silver commonly has a higher work function than halfnium [sic].”308
Noting that “[n]othing in the record suggests that Centricut made its silver
sleeves from one of the relatively few low-work-function forms of silver,”
the court concluded that it was more likely than not that Centricut’s
electrode infringed claim 1.309 In contrast, the court found “too great an
overlap in relative work-function values for silver and copper to give rise to
a reliable inference” as to whether the electrode infringed claim 8.310
Centricut did not appeal the district court’s ruling on indefiniteness,311
but raised the issue of the variability of work functions again in appealing
the district court’s judgment of infringement.312 As Centricut noted, there
was no evidence in the record “of either the actual work-function values or
the actual relative work-function rankings in the accused Centricut
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Id. at *5.
See Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1366; Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., No. 99-CV39, 2003 WL 21558348 at *2 (D.N.H. July 9, 2003)).
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See id. at 1366 & n.3.
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See id. at 1366 (citing Centricut, 2003 WL 21558348, at *3.)).
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See id.
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See id. (citing Centricut, 2003 WL 21558348, at *3).
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See id. at 1367 n. 4
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Brief of Appellants at 7-26, Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1574).
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electrode.”313 According to Centricut, the district court erred in relying on
work function tables as evidence of the actual values applicable to the
accused electrode.314 Such tables “do not show values for materials in
bulk,” because the work function of each specimen varies according to its
own surface and atomic arrangements and the conditions under which the
emission is measured.315
The Federal Circuit agreed with this argument, crediting the testimony
of Centricut’s expert to the effect that “work function is not an intrinsic
property of a metal, but is rather a property of specific surfaces under
specific conditions.”316 The appeals court found that this testimony
“directly contradicted” the district court’s conclusion that the tables showed
that the accused electrode met the work function limitation by a
preponderance of the evidence.317 The Federal Circuit also credited
Centricut’s expert testimony that the observed durability of Centricut’s
accused electrode “could be attributed to a number of different factors,
including temperature, the geometry of the electrode, the thermal and
electrical conductivity of the sleeve, or the sleeve’s resistance to oxidation,
and that it was not reasonable to conclude that longer useful life was
attributable to work function.”318 Noting the district court’s finding that
“the field of technology from which [the invention] sprang is so poorly
understood that it qualifies as a ‘black art,’” the appeals court deemed the
case to be one in which expert testimony was necessary to prove
infringement:
We do not state a per se rule that expert testimony is required
to prove infringement when the art is complex. Suffice it to
say that in a case involving complex technology, where the
accused infringer offers expert testimony negating
infringement, the patentee cannot satisfy its burden of proof
by relying only on testimony from those who are admittedly
not expert in the field.319
Since Esab had not presented any expert witnesses on the issue of work
function, the court concluded that Esab had failed to satisfy its burden of
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Id. at 7; see also Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1365 (“[N]either party introduced any
evidence of tests conducted to directly measure the work function of the materials used in
the accused device. Indeed, neither party introduced evidence of tests or other evidence
concerning the exact materials used in the accused device.”).
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See Brief of Appellants, supra note 312, at 11.
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See id. at 11-14.
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See Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1365.
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See id. at 1367.
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See id. at 1368.
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See id. at 1370.
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proof on infringement.320
Identifying the patent system’s ontological commitments in connection
with the Centricut case reveals at least three illustrative examples of the
patent system’s reliance on scientific essentialism and scientific realism.
First, the issuance of claim 8 required the patent system to incur a de
dicto ontological commitment to a kind of device with essential causal
powers that include “readily emit[ting] electrons upon an electric potential
being applied thereto.”321
While the electron is a paradigmatic
322
unobservable entity, “our best scientific theories” tell us that thermionic
emission is an observable manifestation of a real entity of the natural kind
known to science as the electron.323 The patent system’s commitments to
scientific essentialism and to scientific realism serve to warrant its
acceptance that devices capable of emitting electrons according to claim 8
can exist.324
Second, the Patent Office’s issuance of claims 1 and 8 and the district
court’s judgment of validity entail a finding that well-defined classes of
particulars can be picked out, each particular having, inter alia, a sleeve
characterized by a relatively high work function.325 The work function of a
material is a causal power, insofar as it describes the disposition of the
material to engage in a causal process (i.e., thermionic emission).326 The
patent system’s commitment to scientific essentialism warrants the district
court’s treatment of the sleeve’s work function as an essential property of
each embodiment of the claims,327 even though work function may vary
320

See id.
See supra text accompanying note 303.
322
See supra text accompanying notes 182-184.
323
In a recent book exploring the historicity of scientific realism in the case of the
electron, Theodore Arabtzis describes the emergence of this scientific consensus:
Lorentz, Larmor, and even Thomson eventually adopted a single name,
“electron,” for the theoretical entities they had put forward. Apparently,
they must have thought that those theoretical entities were
representations of the same unobservable entity. A prominent reason for
their thinking so was that the charge-to-mass ratio of ions, electrons, and
corpuscles turned out to be approximately the same. As a result of the
stability of that quantity across different experimental contexts, several
experimental situations (the Zeeman effect, cathode rays, thermionic
emission, the photoelectric effect, beta-rays, etc.) came to be considered
observable manifestations of the same entity, the electron.
ARABATZIS, supra note 183, at 107-08. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
324
See supra text accompanying note 181.
325
See supra text accompanying notes 302-305.
326
See supra text accompanying note 296. The parties agreed to construe the term
“work function” as it was defined in Esab’s patent. Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1364.
327
See supra text accompanying note 151.
321
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widely among different specimens of the same metallic element and under
different conditions of use.328 As the court explained in its ruling on
indefiniteness, any embodiments with silver sleeves that fall within the
scope of Esab’s claims do so in virtue of the sleeves’ work functions rather
than their silver composition.329
Finally and most crucially, the Federal Circuit’s judgment of
noninfringement illustrates that the warrants provided by scientific
essentialism and scientific realism to the patent system’s ontological
commitments are limited in scope by their epistemological reliance on the
argument from the best explanation.330 The district court’s findings
regarding the elemental composition of Centricut’s accused electrode331 did
not warrant a de re ontological commitment to the electrode as an
embodiment of the claim, because such a commitment could not be
grounded in the best available scientific theories.332 In the absence of other
record evidence regarding the scientific theories pertaining to work
function, the Federal Circuit credited the testimony of the only expert in the
case qualified on the subject.333 Given the expert’s testimony to the effect
that the unobserved334 work function of the accused electrode’s sleeve was
neither an intrinsic property of the elemental silver observed in the sleeve’s
composition335 nor an adequate explanation for the electrode’s observed
durability,336 the argument from the best explanation could not justify a
reasonable belief that the accused electrode was an example of the claim.337
The above examination of the Centricut case serves to situate the role of
enablement doctrine in warranting the patent system’s ontological
commitments to claims as kinds whose examples are (possible)
embodiments with essential causal powers. Given that claims are novel
kinds, most of whose examples are unobservable entities,338 such warrants
rely heavily on scientific realism and are justified in doing so by the
argument from the best explanation. The warranting role of an enabling
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See supra text accompanying notes 319-320.
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See supra text accompanying note 313.
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See supra text accompanying note 316.
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See supra text accompanying note 318.
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disclosure, then, is to furnish any theoretical or factual support that may be
required in addition to the support provided by information known in the
art, in order to satisfy the patent system that such reliance on the argument
from the best explanation is justified.
The enablement requirement is met if one of skill in the art “could make
or use the invention from disclosures in the patent coupled with information
known in the art without undue experimentation.”339 The ability of a reader
of the patent disclosure to “make … the invention … without undue
experimentation” logically implies the possible existence of embodiments
as entities. What remains to be warranted by the ability to “use the
invention … without undue experimentation” is the ontological status of the
claim as a kind whose examples are embodiments with essential causal
powers.340 This task is effectively performed by patent law’s operable
utility doctrine,341 which requires that the claimed invention “be ‘capable of
being used to effect the object proposed.’”342
Under the operable utility doctrine, the patent system is normally
inclined to admit a claim into its ontology of “useful Arts” on the basis of a
filed patent application’s representation that embodiments of the claim can
be used for the described purpose.343 Where there are “factual reasons
which would lead one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the
statement of operability,”344 however, the patent system cannot accept such
a representation as an ontological warrant, and therefore requires proof of
utility sufficient to convince one skilled in the art.345 Furthermore, patent
339

United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See supra text accompanying notes 125-129; see generally Atlas Powder.
341
Enablement entails operable utility. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v.
HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“If a patent claim fails to meet the
utility requirement because it is not useful or operative, then it also fails to meet the howto-use aspect of the enablement requirement.”).
342
Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 396 (1873) (citation omitted) (“To
meet the utility requirement, the Supreme Court has held that a new product or process
must be shown to be ‘operable’ — that is, it must be ‘capable of being used to effect the
object proposed.’”).
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See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (“The PTO
has the initial burden of challenging a patent applicant's presumptively correct assertion of
utility.”); see also Ex parte Dash, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1484 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1993),
aff'd, 118 Fed. Appx. 488 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
346 (2005) (“A disclosure of a utility satisfies the utility requirement of section 101 unless
there are reasons for the artisan to question the truth of such disclosure.”); In re Gazave,
379 F.2d 973 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“[I]n the usual case where the mode of operation alleged
can be readily understood and conforms to the known laws of physics and chemistry,
operativeness is not questioned, and no further evidence is required.”).
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In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d at 1224.
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See supra text accompanying notes 192-194.
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law recognizes no scientific theories capable of supporting a belief in the
existence and causal powers of a perpetual motion device,346 and the patent
system in such a case can find warrant for a de dicto ontological
commitment to this kind of device only in a direct observation of an
embodiment that can also warrant de re ontological commitments to both
the claim and the embodiment.347
The patent system’s commitment to scientific realism348 thus manifests
itself doctrinally as a rather liberal approach to epistemological justification,
at least when it comes to de dicto commitment to a claim. Absent factual or
theoretical inconsistencies with the argument from the best explanation, the
patent system may find an acceptable warrant for such a commitment in the
bare assertion that a kind of (possible) entity with certain essential causal
powers exists in this (mind-independent) world, and not merely the (minddependent) world of the inventor’s conception.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a descriptive account of the ontology of
“useful Arts” as revealed by the patent system’s legal doctrines and
practices. In this ontology, claims are novel kinds of embodiments;349 and
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See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text; see also In re Gazave, 379 F.2d at
978 (“[I]f the alleged operation seems clearly to conflict with a recognized scientific
principle as, for example, where an applicant purports to have discovered a machine
producing perpetual motion, the presumption of inoperativeness is so strong that very clear
evidence is required to overcome it.”).
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See supra text accompanying note 191.
The distinction between de re and de dicto ontological commitments to embodiments
may be material to patentability, e.g., where an examiner relies on the applicant’s
experimental results. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354,
1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
To maintain this distinction, the patent system has adopted the linguistic practice of
referring to a disclosed embodiment in the past tense only where de re ontological
commitment is warranted. See id. at 1363-64 (“Example VI is written in the past tense….
From the language used, a reader of the patent would conclude that the protocol was
performed and that the following results were actually achieved.”); MPEP, supra note 209,
at § 608.01(p) (“No results should be represented as actual results unless they have actually
been achieved. Paper examples should not be described using the past tense.”).
To the extent that warrants for de re ontological commitment entail evidence of actual
existence, the patent system may find that a disclosure provides a warrant for de dicto but
not de re commitment. For example, prophetic examples can provide support for a claim if
enabling. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont DeNemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (accepting trial court’s finding that prophetic examples “would be helpful in
enabling someone to make the invention”).
348
See supra section III.B.3.
349
See supra section III.A.
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embodiments are entities whose properties include essential causal
powers,350 and whose possible existence is therefore warranted by scientific
essentialism and scientific realism.351 Many of the most fundamental and
well-established doctrines of patent law commit the patent system to this
ontology, including (1) the patentable subject matter requirement, which
confines patentability to kinds of entities having causal powers;352 (2)
doctrines pertaining to generic disclosure,353 inherent disclosure,354 and
operable utility,355 which presuppose that the possible embodiments of a
claim possess certain (variable) causal powers in virtue of being examples
of the kind defined by the claim; (3) the doctrines of constructive reduction
to practice, anticipation and infringement, which entail commitments to
claims and embodiments in this ontology;356 (4) the written description
requirement, which serves in part to satisfy the patent system’s criteria for
incurring such commitments;357 and (5) the enablement requirement, which
serves in part to warrant such commitments.358 Several other well-known
features of the patent system are also consistent with this ontological
picture, including the infinite scope of patent claims,359 the prohibition on
inferential claiming,360 the construction of preambular language in
claims,361 and the near elimination of the Patent Office’s working model
requirement.362
If this theory correctly describes the patent system’s implicit ontology,
then it also provides a precise criterion for distinguishing between a patentineligible abstract idea and a patent-eligible “practical method or means of
producing a beneficial result or effect.”363 The latter characterization is
applicable only where there is some causal power possessed by every
embodiment in virtue of being an example of the kind defined by the claim
(thereby facilitating scientific realism’s warrant for de dicto ontological
commitment to the kind). Stated more simply, the claim must limit its
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embodiments to some essential causal power.364 I will refer to this rule as
the essential causation requirement.
The essential causation requirement holds considerable promise for
stabilizing and clarifying patentable subject matter doctrine, as illustrated
by the Federal Circuit’s analytical efforts in In re Nuijten.365 In Nuijten, a
three-judge panel reviewed the Patent Office’s rejection of a claim for “a
signal with embedded supplemental data”366 as directed to unpatentable
subject matter.367 Construing the claim, Judge Arthur Gajarsa’s opinion,
joined by Judge Kimberly Moore, found:
The text of the claim[] is not limited by any specified
physical medium…. [It] can of course be embodied by
conventional, known means, such as electrical signals,
modulated electromagnetic waves, and pulses in fiber optic
cable. So long as some object or transmission carries the
information specified by Nuijten’s claim, it falls within that
claim’s scope regardless of its physical form.368
Judge Richard Linn concurred with this finding,369 and further noted that
the claim could cover a signal derived from “a pulse of energy or a stone
tablet.”370 The court divided, however, on the legal question of whether
“[a] transient electric or electromagnetic transmission” is a “manufacture”
within the meaning of § 101 of the Patent Act. The majority focused on the
transmission’s
transience
and
intangibility
as
disqualifying
371
characteristics.
The dissent, however, noted the materiality of the
transmission’s physical carrier, which is given form and therefore
manufactured by human action or a machine,372 and called for a broad
interpretation of the statutory categories to include “anything under the sun
that is made by man.”373

364

Consistent with this requirement, of course, the embodiments may vary with respect
to other causal powers. See supra text accompanying notes 123-124.
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500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Claim 14 of Petrus Nuijten’s application read in full: “A signal with embedded
supplemental data, the signal being encoded in accordance with a given encoding process
and selected samples of the signal representing the supplemental data, and at least one of
the samples preceding the selected samples is different from the sample corresponding to
the given encoding process.” Id. at 1351.
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See id.
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See id. at 1353.
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See id. at 1358
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See id.
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See id. at 1356-57.
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See id. at 1358.
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See id. at 1362-63 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
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While Nuijten is good law,374 Judge Gajarsa’s reasoning has been
subject to well-founded criticism. To the extent that the majority’s legal
conclusion is based on the claimed signal’s transience, it is incompatible
with a 1980 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decision that held
“transitory, unstable, and non-isolatable” chemical intermediates to be
patentable.375 To the extent that the conclusion relies on the reasoning that
“[a] transient electric or electromagnetic transmission” is intangible, it
denies the prevailing scientific view that electrons and photons are particles
that exert pressure on objects.376 The majority’s stated holding, that
physical but transitory electric or electromagnetic forms of signal
transmission are not patent-eligible subject matter,377 is therefore
controversial at best.378
By recognizing the patent system’s metaphysical commitment to the
essential causation requirement, the Nuijten court could have invalidated the
claim on less contested grounds. The objectionable aspect of Nuijten’s
claim to “a signal” was not the transitory or intangible nature of the signal,
but the disparate causal powers that the various embodiments of the claimed
invention purported to employ. All three of the judges construed Nuijten’s
claim so broadly as to encompass every physical medium capable of
carrying data. Presumably, all would also agree that a pulse of
electromagnetic energy employs a different causal power than a stone tablet
in conveying information. Nuijten’s claim would therefore present an easy
case for the essential causation test. It does not limit its embodiments to
any essential causal power, and is therefore simply too abstract to be
compatible with the ontological commitments and warrants that make up
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In particular, Nuijten’s holding survives Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010),
which addressed the scope of the judicially created abstract-idea exclusion from patentable
subject matter for process claims. See id. at 3229-31. The claim at issue in Nuijten was
not a process claim. See 500 F.3d at 1354-55. Also, since the Nuijten holding is based
solely on a determination that the claim does not fall within any of the statutory categories
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of the judicially created exceptions.
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See id. at 1359 (citing In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 519, 521-22 (C.C.P.A. 1980));
In re Nuijten, 515 F.3d 1361, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc) (same).
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See Dolly Y. Wu & Steven M. Geiszler, Patentable Subject Matter: What is the
Matter with Matter?, 15 VA. J. L. & TECH. 101, 128-32 (2010).
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See 500 F.3d at 1353.
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See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1328 n. 68
(2011) (citation omitted) (describing the Nuijten holding as “questionable as a matter of
physics and statutory interpretation”); see also Scott Bloebaum, Comment, From
Telegraphs to Content Protection: The Evolution of Signals as Patentable Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 9 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 243, 265-75 (criticizing Nuijten).
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the patent system’s ontology of “useful Arts.”
Judge Linn proceeded in his dissent to opine that “the outer limits of
statutory subject matter should not depend on metaphysical distinctions
such as those between hardware and software or matter and energy.”379 The
hardware/software and matter/energy distinctions indeed rest on unstable
theoretical foundations,380 but the essential causation requirement does not
necessitate such potentially fine line-drawing, and Judge Linn would have
had no difficulty in applying the requirement to Nuijten’s claim. Of course,
Judge Linn’s comment also gives voice to the patent system’s apparent
discomfort with metaphysical distinctions as a source of legal rules.381 But
as this Article has demonstrated and the Supreme Court acknowledged
more than 160 years ago, the patent system’s involvement with metaphysics
is ubiquitous and profound. If the patent system is to take its existing
metaphysical commitments seriously, the kind of “signal” described by
Nuijten’s abstract claim language cannot be admitted into the patent
system’s ontology.
Judge Randall Rader’s dissenting opinion in In re Bilski382 described
the problems such an ontological mismatch could cause for the patent
system in examining an abstract claim:
When considering the eligibility of “processes,” this court
should focus on the potential for an abstract claim. Such an
abstract claim would appear in a form that is not even
susceptible to examination against prior art under the
traditional tests for patentability. Thus this court would wish
to ensure that the claim supplied some concrete, tangible
technology for examination.383
Judge Rader’s dissent, the only Federal Circuit opinion cited with approval
by the Supreme Court majority in Bilski v. Kappos,384 describes an
essentially metaphysical approach to the abstract-ideas exclusion. Judge
Rader would hold that abstract claims are “not even susceptible to
examination against prior art” because to perform such an examination
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would entail the category error385 of treating an abstract idea as if it were
“concrete, tangible technology.” The ontological mismatch between an
abstract claim and the “useful Arts”386 would reveal itself in the patent
system’s practice of examining the claim against prior art.387
The descriptive ontological account in this Article, therefore, may have
considerable prescriptive relevance as the Federal Circuit takes up the Bilski
Court’s invitation to “develop[] other limiting criteria that further the
purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.”388 As this
Article has demonstrated, among the purposes of the Patent Act is the
regulation of the patent document’s role in informing the patent system’s
ontological commitments. The essential causation requirement furthers that
purpose, coheres with the patent system’s statutes, doctrines and practices,
and draws meaningful patent-eligibility distinctions without “pos[ing]
questions of such intricacy and refinement that they risk obscuring” the
patent system’s larger goals.389 In a forthcoming article,390 I will
demonstrate the application of the essential causation requirement to several
legally significant information technology patents. My tentative conclusion
is that the “machine-or-transformation” inquiry, though downgraded by the
Bilski Court from a “test” to a “useful and important clue,”391 can
appropriately be adopted as a strict requirement for the patent-eligibility of
software-implemented inventions.392
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See supra note 228 (defining category mistake).
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from the Business Software Alliance, Biotechnology Industry Organization et al., the
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This Article has not come close to conducting an exhaustive inventory
of the patent system’s metaphysical commitments. In another future article,
I plan to explore the patent system’s orientation to mental causation and the
so-called mind-body problem, which are perhaps the most enduring
controversies in all of metaphysics.393 The standard causal account of how
the patent system “promote[s] the Progress of . . . useful Arts” seems
unproblematically to traverse the boundary between mental and physical
properties without engaging in any of these metaphysical debates: (1) the
patent system hastens inventions and disclosures by offering patents as
economic incentives394 to (2) inventors who conceive,395 reduce to
practice,396 and disclose their (3) inventions, which others can learn (at will)
and use (as authorized by the patentee) to produce beneficial effects.397
It might be suggested that to foreground the implicit mind-body
metaphysics within this account is to risk taking sides in a dispute the patent
system lacks the time and expertise to adjudicate rigorously. For example,
the doctrine conferring inventorship on one who conceives of an invention
but relies on another to reduce it to practice398 may appear to commit the

393

For a description of the philosophical controversies surrounding the mind-body
problem, see, e.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 608 (Ted Honderich ed.
2005) (describing the modern “mind-body debate” as focused on “the status of mental
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problem dates back to René Descartes in 1641. See RENÉ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON
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(quoting 1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890)) (defining conception as the “formation in
the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative
invention”).
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(producing an embodiment of the invention in “physical or tangible form,” see Wetmore v.
Quick, 536 F.2d 937, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1976)), entails a physical act.
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See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-29 (Fed. Cir.
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to the joint arrival at a definite and permanent idea of the invention as it will be used in
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patent system to mind-body dualism399 (the view that the mind is not part of
the physical world400), a stance that is under heavy siege from contemporary
neuroscience401 and has long fallen out of fashion among analytic
philosophers.402 More fundamentally, the interactions of minds, bodies and
money in innovative processes are too complex and varied to be
metaphysically subsumed under a single causal account of how the patent
laws hasten innovation.403
Closer study of these metaphysical accounts of causation could also
illuminate the law-of-nature exclusion from patentable subject matter. A
potential doctrinal difficulty arises from the fact that our knowledge of the
physical laws that govern causality in the world is contingent and
incomplete. For example, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook404 cites
Newton’s law of universal gravitation as an unpatentable “scientific
principle” that “reveals a relationship that has always existed.”405 But the
relationship F = Gmm′ / r 2 “exists” between two bodies, if at all, only
where there are no forces other than gravitational forces at work.406
Moreover, its status as a “fundamental truth” is subject to falsification by
course of “defining [the client’s] invention to obtain, if possible, a valid patent with
maximum coverage”).
The determination of priority of inventorship is a distinct issue, and is not based solely
on first conception. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (providing that priority determination shall
consider conception, reduction to practice, and diligence); see also Price v. Symsek, 988
F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Although derivation and priority of invention are akin
in that both focus on inventorship . . . they are distinct concepts.”).
399
See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 186 (2007) (arguing that the conception-focused
inventorship doctrine exemplifies a “striking pattern of dualism” in the patent system).
400
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unanimous in rejecting frank dualism.”).
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future contrary observations,407 which will remain possible as long as
physics is unable to provide a complete account of all phenomena.408 If the
Court’s language in Le Roy and Flook is read as a permanent ontological
commitment to Newton’s law (and other laws of today’s physics) as true
descriptions of the natural world, then those precedents are untenable as a
basis for a metaphysical characterization of the “laws of nature”
exception.409
My current view is that both of the above difficulties are the avoidable
result of reading problematic metaphysical commitments into patent
doctrine where none need be found. The inventorship doctrine’s account of
mental causation does not entail mind-body dualism. The structure and
function of the patent incentive are essentially teleological, not causal.
Patent-eligibility determinations can be grounded in today’s best scientific
theories without committing the patent system to accept their truth should
they eventually be falsified. While I claim no special knowledge regarding
the future,410 I trust that this Article has demonstrated the potential value of
further inquiries into the patent system’s metaphysical commitments,
regardless of their ultimate outcomes.
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